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* * * * * * * 
JURISDICTION 
The authority believed to confer jurisdiction on the Supreme 
Court of the State of Utah to hear this appeal from the Third 
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County is Article VIII, 
Section 4 of the Utah Constitution; Utah Code Ann., Section 78-2-
2(3) (j) (1988); and Rule 3(a) Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
The Supreme Court, acting pursuant to Rule 42, Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, transferred this appeal to this Court by order 
dated April 3, 1992. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
A. The following issues were presented for review in this 
case by the appellant: 
1. Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion in denying 
the motion of appellant, Master Protection Corporation, dba 
Firemaster (hereinafter "Firemaster") to continue the trial. 
Firemaster claims this issue is a mixed question of fact 
and law. The nature and extent of the facts supporting and 
opposing motion for a continuance of the trial date are reviewable 
under a clearly erroneous standard. Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a); State v. 
Humphreys, 707 P.2d 109 (Utah 1985). Whether the Trial Court 
abused its discretion in refusing to continue the trial date is a 
question of law reviewed for correctness. Griffiths v. Hammon. 560 
P.2d 1375, 1376 (Utah 1977). 
2. Did the Trial Court err in refusing to grant 
Firemaster a new trial where the jury issued verdicts that were 
inconsistent between Firemaster and Mr. Holbrook? This issue is 
a question of law reviewed for correctness. Marchant v. Park City, 
111 P.2d 677 (Utah App. 1989). 
3. Was substantial evidence presented at trial 
respecting the nature or extent of, or responsibility for, damages 
to Mr. Holbrook beyond those for unpaid sales commissions to 
constitute an abuse of discretion by the Trial Court in refusing 
to grant Firemaster's motion for a remittitur of the jury's award 
of $50,000 on Mr. Holbrook's claim for breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing? 
This issue is a mixed question of fact and law. The 
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factual composition of the disputed damages is reviewable under a 
clearly erroneous standard. Utah R.Civ. P.52(a); Matter of Estate 
of Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989). The propriety of the 
Trial Court's refusal to compel a remittitur of the disputed 
damages is a question of law reviewed for correctness. Marchant, 
supra at 677. 
4. Did the Trial Court err in refusing to award 
attorneys' fees to Firemaster as the "prevailing party" on the 
parties' respective breach of contract claims? This is a question 
of law reviewed for correctness. Marchant, supra 771 P.2d at 677. 
5. Did the Trial Court err in refusing to enter judgment 
against Mr. Holbrook for any portion of three promissory notes that 
he signed to purchase his franchises? 
This issue is a mixed question of fact and law. The 
extent to which Mr. Holbrook is indebted to Firemaster under the 
notes is a factual issue reviewable under a clearly erroneous 
standard. Matter of Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d at 886. Whether 
Mr. Holbrook is excused from performing his obligations under the 
notes is a question of law reviewed for correctness. Marchant, 
supra 771 P. 2d at 677. 
6. Did the Trial Court err in overruling Firemaster's 
objection to the statement of Mr. Holbrook's counsel in closing 
argument that he was "... just certain that none of you (jurors) 
would choose to be placed in that kind of a circumstance (of being 
forced to enter into promissory notes), and were you, that you 
would feel as though you had been forced into the decision to go 
into debt?" This is a question of law reviewed for correctness. 
Marchant, supra 771 P.2d at 677. 
7. Did the Trial Court err in deciding to terminate a 
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Holbrook, an injunction that enjoined Mr. Holbrook from using any 
confidential customer information. This is a question of law 
reviewed for correctness. Marchant, supra 771 P.2d at 677. 
B. Statement of issues presented by the cross-appeal of Mr. 
Holbrook: 
1. Did the Trial Court err in refusing to grant the 
Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment requesting that 
Firemaster should be ordered to perform and pay for a fair and 
impartial accounting under the contracts? This is a question of 
law to be reviewed for correctness. Marchant, supra, at 677. 
2. Did the Trial Court err in granting Firemaster's 
Motion to Dismiss the State and Federal Racketeering claims by Mr. 
Holbrook? This is a question of law reviewed for correctness as 
a result of the Trial Court's decision to grant Firemaster's Rule 
12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss. Marchant, supra, at 677. 
3. Did the Trial Court err in refusing to permit Mr. 
Holbrook to put on evidence at trial of lost profits incurred as 
a result of the imposition of the preliminary injunction and/or 
alternatively to permit such a determination as part of Mr. 
Holbrook's post-trial Motion for Declaratory Relief? 
This is a question of law reviewed for correctness. 
Marchant, supra, at 677. 
4. Was the award of only $5,872.36 in punitive damages 
error where the District Court refused to permit evidence of 
Firemaster's net worth to go to the jury? 
This is a question of law reviewed for correctness. 
Marchant, supra, at 677. 
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5. Did the Trial court err in nor granting rar. 
Holbrook's Motion for Directed Verdict, Motion for Judgment NOV, 
and Motion for Declaratory Relief, striking the jury verdict to 
Firemaster regarding the breaches of the confidentiality provisions 
of the contracts? The result of a determination in Mr. Holbrook's 
favor would be a finding of a wrongful injunction and that Mr. 
Holbrook was the prevailing party for assessing and awarding costs 
and attorneys' fees. 
This is a mixed question of law and fact. The factual 
composition of the question is reviewable under a clearly erroneous 
standard. See Matter of Estate of Bartell, supra. The question of 
law is Marchant, supra, at 677. 
6. Did the Trial Court err in refusing to award Mr. 
Holbrook his attorneys' fees and costs as the prevailing party in 
the action under the contracts, based upon the "net winner" 
concept, or by law. 
This is a mixed question of law and fact. The factual 
composition of the issue is reviewable under a clearly erroneous 
standard. Matter of Estate of Bartell, supra. The legal 
composition of the question is to be reviewed for correctness. 
Marchant, supra. 
7. Did the District Court err in requiring Mr. Holbrook 
to pay the sum of $11,014.00 in cash as an "equitable" payment to 
Firemaster for access to the confidential customer list after Mr. 
Holbrook was found to have fully performed his obligations under 
the contracts until he terminated because of the breaches of 
Firemaster over the two and one-half year period prior to his 
termination? 
This is a mixed question of law and fact. The factual 
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standard. Matter of Estate of Bartell, supra. The legal 
composition of the question is to be reviewed for correctness. 
Marchant, supra, at 677. 
III. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, ORDINANCES OR RULES 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances 
or rules whose interpretation is believed to be solely 
determinative of the outcome of this case. 
IV. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN 
DISTRICT COURT. 
Bard Holbrook, the Plaintiff in this case, instituted 
this action to recover funds from sales, services, and from 
overcharges for parts purchases for which he had either not been 
paid, or for which he had been overcharged pursuant to accounting 
decisions by Firemaster and for reimbursement for services paid for 
by him but never rendered in whole or in part by Firemaster under 
a series of territory and franchise agreements (collectively, the 
"Franchise Agreements") with Master Protection Corporation, 
(hereinafter referred to as "Firemaster"). 
Mr. Holbrook claimed that the underpayments and 
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overcharges relating to the sums owed him by Firemaster not only 
constituted breaches of the various agreements but were done in an 
intentional, consistent pattern which constituted among other 
claims conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, racketeering, fraud, 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in 
contracts and justified the imposition of punitive damages. 
All of the claims of Mr. Holbrook in this action are as 
a result of Firemaster's actions during the time period of June, 
1987 through January of 1990 when Mr. Holbrook was working under 
the agreements between the parties. In January of 1990, after Mr. 
Holbrook had terminated his relationship with Firemaster he started 
his own company in the fire suppression industry in competition 
with Firemaster. 
Firemaster counter-claimed in the lawsuit for alleged 
breaches of the franchise agreements for actions of Mr. Holbrook 
after his termination of the agreements in January of 1990. 
Firemaster introduced absolutely no evidence at Trial to show any 
breaches of the agreements by Mr. Holbrook prior to his termination 
of the agreements in January 1990. In fact, Firemaster stipulated 
it would introduce no such evidence (Tr. at R. 5244-45). The 
special jury verdicts returned by the jury found Mr. Holbrook to 
have honored all three agreements and Firemaster to have breached 
all three agreements.(R. 2729-37, 2759-60). 
Shortly after entering the lawsuit, Firemaster requested 
a preliminary injunction restraining Mr. Holbrook from servicing 
certain accounts during the pendency of the action which he had 
serviced while associated with Firemaster. The District Court 
imposed such preliminary injunction and required a bond only 
$75,000, well below the $500,000 bond requested by Mr. Holbrook. 
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Mr. Holbrook made a motion to the Trial Court for a 
partial summary judgment for an accounting on the grounds that 
Firemaster had been assigned all sales by Mr. Holbrook under the 
contracts and by contract was paid to perform bookkeeping and 
accounting for Mr. Holbrook regarding such accounts receivable. 
The Court denied this motion. 
Firemaster made several motions to dismiss various claims 
brought by Mr. Holbrook. One motion sought to dismiss Mr. 
Holbrook's claims against Firemaster under the Utah State and 
Federal Racketeering Statutes. The Court granted such motion on 
the basis that the choice of law provisions in the contracts 
dictated that California law applied. (R. 1671-74) and not Utah or 
Federal law. 
At trial, the jury issued a series of special verdicts, 
which among other things awarded Mr. Holbrook compensatory damages 
of $85,935.06 .1 In doing so, the jury specifically determined Mr. 
Holbrook had fulfilled all his obligations under the contracts and 
that Firemaster, by its actions, was prohibited from enforcing the 
contracts against Mr. Holbrook. (R. 2729-37, 2759-60). 
As a consequence of the jury being presented with a 
lengthy number of special verdicts (R. 2719-62), the jury made an 
apparently contradictory ruling by awarding Firemaster $10,000 in 
damages on one of its counter-claims for alleged breaches of the 
confidentiality provisions of agreements (including a trade secret 
agreement) which the jury found to be still in effect in some 
manner after Mr. Holbrook's termination with Firemaster in January 
of 1990. (R. 2726-28) . 
The jury also awarded Mr. Holbrook $5,872.36 in punitive 
damages against Firemaster on his conversion cause of action. 
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In entering final judgments in the case based upon the 
jury's verdicts, (R. 3882-91), the Trial Court rejected Mr. 
Holbrook's claim that Utah law as found by this Court in the cases 
of Wright v. Westside Nursery, 787 P.2d 508 (Utah App. 1990) and, 
Kinsman v. Kinsman, 748 P.2d 210 (Utah App. 1988) clearly mandates 
that because: 
1) Mr. Holbrook was found to have honored his obligations 
under the contracts between June of 1987 and January of 1990; and 
2) only thereafter acted in contravention of such 
contracts; and 
3) that to the contrary Firemaster repeatedly breached 
all the contracts from June of 1987 through January of 1990; 
4) that the Trial Court should have applied the law to 
this case and declared that all Mr. Holbrook's obligations under 
all the agreements were terminated and as a matter of law stricken 
the $10,000 award to Firemaster under its claim for breach of the 
confidentiality provisions of the contracts. 
Both sides submitted multiple post-trial motions to the 
Trial Court. The failure of the Trial Court to clarify the 
respective legal positions of the parties' rights and obligations 
under the contracts and thereafter, based upon the clear chronology 
of the case, denied Mr. Holbrook being found by the Trial Court to 
be the prevailing party in the action for purposes of recovering 
his costs and attorneys' fees. 
At Trial, the Court had granted portions of Firemaster's 
motion in limine by refusing to permit Mr. Holbrook to submit 
evidence of damages he sustained as a result of the imposition of 
the injunction to the jury on the basis that he had not properly 
pled the issue of special damages under Rule 9(g), Utah Rules of 
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Holbrook damages for the imposition of the injunction as requested 
by him in his post-trial Motion for Declaratory Relief. 
The Trial Court, by granting Firemaster's objection to 
such evidence at trial, refused to permit the submission of the 
Firemaster financial statement to the jury, notwithstanding the 
jury being permitted to consider the issue of the appropriate 
amount of punitive damages which was submitted by way of a special 
verdict form. (R. 2743-45). The jury assessed punitive damages 
against Firemaster as a result of the conversion of his funds by 
Firemaster. The correct amount of punitive damages could not 
possibly have been assessed as a result of the jury having no 
financial information pertaining to Firemaster. An award of 
punitive damages without financial information pertaining to the 
Defendant's net worth is clearly a violation of Utah law. See 
Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 164 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 
1991) . 
In the process of arguing Firemaster's post-trial motion to 
impose liability on Mr. Holbrook for the promissory notes 
associated with the franchise purchase, the Trial Court arrived at 
the result, sua sponte, of awarding Firemaster the sum of 
$11,014.00 as an "equitable" payment by Mr. Holbrook for access to 
customer information. 
Final judgment was entered on Mr. Holbrook's complaint 
and Firemaster's counterclaims on October 3, 1991 (R. 3882-91). 
The Trial Court thereafter denied Mr. Holbrook's Motion for 
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and Firemaster's Motions for 
Remittitur, New Trial and for Judgment NOV by Order dated January 
3, 1992 (R. 4253-54). Firemaster filed its notice of appeal on 
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January 27, 1992 (R. 4255). Mr. Holbrook filed his notice of 
cross-appeal on February 4, 1992 (R. 4262). 
B. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Bard N. Holbrook, the Plaintiff, Respondent and Cross-
Appellee herein, had been engaged in the business of fire 
prevention and suppression services in the State of Utah and 
surrounding areas for approximately seventeen years when this 
matter was instituted in January of 1990. (Tr. at R. 4342-43). 
For the two and one-half year period prior to January of 
199 0, Mr. Holbrook had been affiliated with a company known as 
Firemaster, in the capacity of an independent contractor and 
franchisee. 
During this time period of 1987-1990, Mr. Holbrook 
provided goods and services in large part to those customers he had 
been servicing for many years prior to his association with 
Firemaster. (Tr. at R. 4374-75). 
Firemaster is a Delaware corporation, having it's 
principle place of business in Los Angeles, California. Firemaster 
is the largest company of its kind in the country the fire 
suppression industry. 
Firemaster did not operate any business in the State of 
Utah prior to approximately June of 19 87. In June of 1987, 
Firemaster bought Intermountain Fire, a fire protection company 
situated in Salt Lake City. Intermountain Fire was a company that 
provided fire suppression sales and services throughout the State 
of Utah. Mr. Robin Phillips was the principal owner of 
Intermountain Fire and stayed on with Firemaster after the purchase 
of Intermountain Fire as the Firemaster Branch and District 
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prior to its purchase by Firemaster. 
At the time in approximately June of 19 87 that Firemaster 
purchased Intermountain Fire, it terminated the service technicians 
such as Mr. Holbrook and informed them that they could come to work 
for Firemaster solely as independent contractors. (Tr. at R. 4349-
50, 5061-64). Mr. Holbrook then executed an independent contractor 
agreement with Firemaster. See Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 1. (Tr. 
at R. 4349-50, 4376-78). 
In April of 1988, Mr. Holbrook was advised if he did not 
purchase franchises in the area in which he was servicing customers 
as an independent contractor that such territories would be sold 
to someone else and he would be terminated. Faced with losing the 
territories he had been servicing for years and the prospect of 
the enforcement against him of the non-competition clauses of the 
contracts, he entered into Purchase Agreements regarding two 
franchise areas as set forth in the franchise purchase documents, 
Plaintiff's Trial Exhibits 2 and 3. (Tr. at R. 4386-4404) 
Mr. Holbrook continued to operate in the independent 
contractor and franchise areas until January of 1990, when he 
notified Firemaster that he believed he had been underpaid 
commissions,that he had been overcharged relating to sales and 
services performed by him under the applicable agreements and that 
he had not been provided services for which he had paid Firemaster 
substantial sums of money. Mr. Holbrook made demand upon 
Firemaster to resolve the problems, but after it refused to do so 
he terminated his relationship and instituted this litigation. (R. 
3-182) 
At the time Mr. Holbrook instituted this litigation he 
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formed a new company called Fire Suppression Services, Inc. and 
began performing similar services in the same territories as he had 
performed for the prior 17 years, including those years when he was 
associated with Firemaster. Firemaster promptly counter-claimed 
against Mr. Holbrook alleging that he owed various sums under the 
franchise agreements, including promissory notes for the purchase 
of the franchise areas and additionally made claims for breaches 
of the franchise agreements.(R. 225-545). 
At Trial, as set forth in the special verdict forms (R. 
2729-37, 2759-60), the jury found that Mr. Holbrook had fully 
performed his obligations under each of the contracts between the 
parties. Additionally the special jury verdicts reflected findings 
in favor of Mr. Holbrook for Firemaster's breach of fiduciary duty, 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 
conversion, and punitive damages associated with such conversion. 
(R. 2719-62) 
The jury awarded damages to Firemaster against Mr. 
Holbrook for breach of the confidentiality provisions of the 
contracts (on one or all of the agreements set forth on the special 
verdict, R. 2726-28) and for sums relating to parts that Firemaster 
alleged had not been paid for or returned at the time of Mr. 
Holbrook's termination. Mr. Arthur Miller, Mr. Holbrook's expert 
accountant, included such sums referenced in the conversion claim 
in his report, (Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 32) but the jury chose 
to ignore such evidence. That award is not the subject of any 
appeal. 
Of particular importance in this case are the factual 
findings by the jury on the first three special verdict forms 
relating to each of the three agreements of the parties, which all 
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Question No. 2: Do you find that the Plaintiff Bard Holbrook fully 
performed his obligations under the territory agreement [and 
franchise agreement] prior to it's termination? 
Answer: Yes, or No. 
Answer: Yes. 
Question No. 3: Do you find the Plaintiff Bard Holbrook was 
lawfully excused from performing any further obligations under the 
territory agreement? 
Answer Yes, or No. 
Answer: Yes. 
Question No. 4: Do you find the Defendant Firemaster wrongfully 
and without excuse or justification failed to pay Plaintiff Bard 
Holbrook the commissions and provide services set forth in Section 
4 and 8 of the territory agreement? 
Answer: Yes, or No. 
Answer: Yes. (R. 2729-2737) 
It is crucial to focus on the time period covered by the 
agreements and the answers of the jury set forth above, i.e. June 
of 1987 through the end of Mr. Holbrook's association with 
Firemaster in January of 1990. The jury award to Firemaster of 
$10,000 for Mr. Holbrook's alleged breaches of the confidentially 
provisions of the contracts occurred only after Mr. Holbrook's 
termination of his association with Firemaster. 
The chronologies in this case must be followed clearly 
in order to understand both the validity of Mr. Holbrook's appeals 
and the invalidity of Firemaster's appeals. Both parties reserved 
certain issues to be presented to the Court for declaratory relief 
after Trial. Mr. Holbrook made certain motions to the Court for 
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such motions for declaratory relief by denying Mr, Holbrookes 
request for attorneys' fees and for special damages to impose 
liability on the injunction bond. (Tr. at R. 4844-46). The Court, 
however, did specifically, independent of the jury, rule that Mr. 
Holbrook had no further obligations under the contracts except to 
pay a sum, described by the Court as an "equitable" payment for 
access to the names on the customer list that Mr. Holbrook had been 
working with while associated with Firemaster. (Tr. at R. 4844-46, 
R. 3728-29) 
Pursuant to Section 8 of each of the contracts between 
the parties, (R. 42-46, 92-95, 148-151) Firemaster was paid a 
substantial portion of the proceeds from each sale (generally from 
25% to 57% of each transaction) to perform certain general services 
defined by Firemaster to include bookkeeping and accounting 
services. In pre-trial proceedings Mr. Holbrook requested by way 
of a motion for partial summary judgment for an accounting, that 
because of his payments to Firemaster under the contracts for 
services in Section 8 of the contracts, that Firemaster should be 
required to perform an independent accounting and pay for the 
expenses thereof in order to clearly establish the amounts owed 
Mr. Holbrook under contracts between the parties (R. 974-991, 1060-
1297, 1408-13, 1419-35, 1436-57). The Court denied such motion. 
(R. 1621-24). Thereafter, Mr. Holbrook was required to hire and 
pay his own independent accountant to determine such information. 
The cost of such work was set forth in Mr. Holbrook's motion for 
costs and attorney's fees filed after trial. (R. 3343-49). Mr. 
Holbrook has never been reimbursed these amounts. 
Mr. Holbrook made claims that Firemaster's actions in 
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uiiv-icJ.paying commission and overcharging for deductions from such 
commissions were done in an intentional pattern of racketeering. 
(R. 1332-65)• Firemaster brought multiple motions to dismiss those 
racketeering claims which were responded to by memoranda in 
opposition and multiple amended complaints. (R. 198-221, 667-701, 
713-737A, 811-841, 1332-69, 1458-81, 1529-91, 1606-17, 1618-20, 
1626-38, 1671-74). At the final hearing on this issue, the Court 
dismissed the Federal and Utah State Racketeering claims of Mr. 
Holbrook based upon it's stated decision that California law 
applied to the conduct between the parties and whereas no 
California racketeering claim had been made, the Court dismissed 
all racketeering charges. (Tr. at R. 5158-68, 5174-91). 
Firemaster brought various motions in limine the day 
before trial, one of which was specifically aimed at limiting Mr. 
Holbrook's right to bring the issue of lost profits to the jury's 
attention.(R. 3034-45, 3137-42). Mr. Holbrook's Second Amended 
Complaint alleges at paragraph 139 (R. 1369) that he was damaged 
as a result of a wrongful injunction being entered. The Court 
nevertheless ruled that Mr. Holbrook could not put on evidence of 
such lost profits because Mr. Holbrook specifically did not say the 
words lost profits or plead the same appropriately in his complaint 
according to the Court. (Tr. at R. 5005-10, 5532-33). The Court 
additionally denied Mr. Holbrook relief for such lost profits on 
this issue in his post-trial request for such relief. (Tr. at R. 
4808-13, 4825) 
The Court permitted the issue of punitive damages to go 
the jury.(R. 2743-45). Mr. Holbrook's counsel requested that 
Firemaster's financial statement be introduced into evidence, but 
the Court sustained the objection of Firemaster to such evidence 
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Firemaster as evidence for the jury to consider. (Tr. at R. 5442-
43). In post-trial proceedings the Court indicated that all 
parties had responsibility in the failure to appropriately submit 
the issue of punitive damages under Utah law to the jury, including 
Plaintiff's counsel, Defense counsel and the Court. (Tr. at R. 
5795-5803). Under any circumstance, the correct amount of punitive 
damages could not properly be assessed under Utah Law where 
evidence of the substantial net worth of Firemaster was not 
admitted into evidence. See Crookston, supra. 
The Plaintiff made a Motion for Directed Verdict and for 
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict based upon the evidence and 
supported by the jury's specific findings that Mr. Holbrook had 
fully performed his obligations under the contracts during the time 
period they were in force, from June of 1987 through January of 
1990, and that thereafter by law he had no further obligations to 
perform under such contracts. (Tr. at R. 5441-2, R. 3903-12). Such 
Motions for Directed Verdict and Judgment Notwithstanding the 
Verdict were based upon the Utah Court of Appeal's rational in the 
cases of Wright, supra and Kinsman, supra. The Trial Court had 
clearly made the decision, independent of the jury, that the prior 
breaches by Firemaster negated any ability of Firemaster to enforce 
the terms of the territory and franchise agreements against Mr. 
Holbrook. (Tr. at R. 4844-46). 
Upon the Court's own motion and without any apparent 
motion by the parties, the Court fashioned what it termed an 
"equitable" remedy in requiring Mr. Holbrook to pay the sum of 
$11,014.00 in cash for access to the confidential customer list. 
(Tr. at R. 4836-4847, R. 3728-29). 
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•me court further denied Mr. Holbrook's request for his 
costs and attorneys' fees by making the statement that it appeared 
to the Court there was no prevailing party to the Court. (Tr. at 
R. 4830, 4844-46). 
Firemaster brought various post-trial motions including 
a motion for new trial and request for remittitur which the Trial 
Court denied. Those claims are in part what make up Firemaster's 
appeal. The remainder of Firemaster's claims in it's appeal are 
claimed abuses of the Court's discretion. 
The jury and Judge Brian independently found that Mr. 
Holbrook had lived up to obligations for two and one-half years. 
Relief was awarded him for his faithful performance under the 
contracts. Firemaster did obtain some apparently contradictory 
relief as a result of the multiple special jury verdicts being 
submitted to the jury, which verdicts contain potential legal 
contradictions but no factual contradiction by virtue of the 
chronology of events. Such is the nature of multiple special 
verdict cases. The Trial Court could and should have rectified any 
inconsistencies based upon sound legal principles. It is the duty 
of the jury to find facts and the Court to apply the law. Brigham 
v. Moon Lake Elec. Assn., 470 P.2d 393 (Utah 1970). 
Mr. Holbrook introduced as Exhibits at trial the 
thousands of transactional accounting records that were generated 
during his association with Firemaster to substantiate his claims. 
(Tr. Exhibits 101-4182). Mr. Holbrook and his expert accountant 
were the only ones who testified they had reviewed all such 
records. Firemaster at all times had such records and in fact 
obtained all such documents from Firemaster (R. 974-991, 1224-81, 
1621-24). 
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The problems in such records were testified to by Mr. Holbrook. 
(Tr. at R. 4416-70) and by his expert accountant, Mr. Arthur Miller 
(Tr. at R. 4768-80A, 5258-81, 5585-98). 
All the relevant facts in this case are those pertaining 
to Firemaster's conduct from June of 19 87 through January of 19 90. 
What happened after that time between these parties as a matter of 
law should be easily resolvable, i.e. no contracts existed and the 
parties had no further obligations by law under any contracts, with 
logical legal and factual consequences to follow. 
V. 
SUMMARY OF FIREMASTER'S ARGUMENTS ON APPEAL 
A. Firemaster claims it was damaged by the Trial Court's 
abuse of discretion in not granting a continuance of the Trial. 
This is much ado over nothing. Counsel for Firemaster twice 
specifically accepted the Court's motion of a brief continuance to 
prepare for cross-examination of Mr. Holbrook's expert accountant 
rather than continue to try for any other or further continuance. 
(Tr. at R. 5243-44, 5280-81). As stated by counsel for Firemaster, 
he believed that the trial was going well for his client and he did 
not desire to postpone the conclusion of the Trial because of his 
belief that he would prevail based upon the proceedings to that 
point in time. 
The Court had previously granted Firemaster a continuance 
(R. 2627). The Court entered appropriate orders to protect against 
surprise. (Tr. at R. 4269-96). The documents Firemaster 
complained of, the so-called "A" documents, were never introduced 
as exhibits. These exhibits were the sole reason Firemaster 
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occurred to Firemaster. 
Firemaster had adequate opportunity to perform its own 
independent accounting on all records because they were in 
Firemaster's possession, for the years 1987 through 1990. Mr. 
Holbrook paid Firemaster approximately $158,000 over that time 
period to perform accounting and bookkeeping services for him.(Tr. 
at R. 4521, Plaintiff's Trial Exhibits 11 and 34). 
No abuse of discretion could have occurred where 
Firemaster twice stipulated to accept the Court's solution of a 
brief continuance, rather than pursuing it's motion, thinking it 
was winning the trial. Now that Firemaster lost, it can only be 
in bad faith or frivolous that it attempts to have an extra crack 
at the evidence through this appeal issue. 
B. The Court should find that the $10,000 award to 
Firemaster for it's special verdict regarding it's claim for breach 
of the confidentiality provisions of the written agreements should 
be vacated under the this Court's ruling in Wright, supra, and 
Kinsman, supra, based upon the premise that Firemaster's prior 
breaches of all three contracts, and Mr. Holbrook's fulfillment of 
his obligations under all three contracts, constituted legal 
justification for Mr. Holbrook's termination of the agreements and 
for excusing Mr. Holbrook from further performance under them. 
Such a decision would eliminate Firemaster's appellate claim, of 
inconsistent verdicts necessitating a new trial and any problems 
associated with such verdict. It is the duty of the Court to apply 
law to the special verdicts, Brigham, supra. 
C. The evidence amply supports the Court's entry of 
judgment of $50,000 to Mr. Holbrook's on his claim for breach of 
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and his accountant testified to actual damages of $207,546.34. (Tr. 
at R. 4251, Trial Exhibits 11 and 34). Firemaster failed to 
marshall the evidence to show how or if this particular jury 
verdict was in error or that there was a lack of substantial, non-
speculative evidence regarding such damage award. Therefore, 
Firemaster failed in meeting its burden on appeal and this Court 
should not give the appeal on this issue any consideration. See 
Mountain States Broadcasting, infra. 
D. Firemaster's request for it's attorneys' fees has the 
correct situations reversed. Once this Court answers the threshold 
legal question of Mr. Holbrook's obligations after his termination 
of the contracts in January of 1990, it can and should find Mr. 
Holbrook was the prevailing party under the contracts for the 
purpose of assessing costs and attorneys' fees. This Court can and 
should also base such decision as well upon the "net award" 
concept, as a result of all of the damages awarded Mr. Holbrook 
arising out of conduct relating to performance under the contracts 
during the relevant two and one-half year period between the 
parties. See Mountain States Broadcasting v. Neale, 776 P.2d 643 
(Utah App. 1989). Mr. Holbrook should also be the party awarded 
his costs and attorneys' fees in the case by law. See Utah Code 
Annotated 78-27-56. 
E. To award Firemaster damages on the notes as requested 
by Firemaster under the agreements would be a ludicrous result 
where the Trial Court and the jury independently corroborated each 
other's decisions in finding that Mr. Holbrook had no further 
duties under the contracts between the parties. Additionally, 
Firemaster has possession of the territories those notes were to 
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puiuiase ana mis issue is moot. The notes represent the full 
purchase price of the territories with the ability by Firemaster 
to award all the rights of a Firemaster franchisee, which rights 
Firemaster will not transfer to Mr. Holbrook and which association 
he does not want. The notes are not collectible by virtue of 
Firemaster's prior preaches of the contracts and because the 
territories, which the notes pay for, are in Firemaster's 
possession. 
F. The use of Mr. Holbrook's counsel's emotional appeal 
in closing argument, specifically any alleged "golden rule", is not 
supported by specific Utah Law, but generally is an issue of 
argument for the Court to consider. The statement alleged to 
violate this concept by Firemaster could hardly be substantial 
enough to generate passion or prejudice to cause the jury to render 
a decision based upon such passion on prejudice. 
The very issue addressed by the alleged error was made 
in support of Mr. Holbrook's claim that he was forced to enter into 
the franchise agreements under duress. (Tr. at R. 5477-78). The 
jury specifically denied Mr. Holbrook relief on this claim (R. 
2759). Therefore in fact, Firemaster prevailed on the issue and 
no prejudice has occurred to it from any alleged error. 
G. Firemaster is not entitled to any further equitable 
relief in the form of an injunction once it had been found to have 
violated the terms of it's own contracts over a two and one-half 
year period. To extend equitable and contractual rights to 
Firemaster after it had been found to have breached it's contracts, 
to have breached its fiduciary duty to Mr. Holbrook, to have acted 
in bad faith towards its performance under the contracts, to have 
intentionally converted the commissions of Mr. Holbrook in a manner 
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justifying the position of punitive damages after Mr. Holbrook 
fully performed his obligations under the contracts would destroy 
every conceivable viable basis for awarding equitable relief. The 
Court also does not have the right to re-write the parties 
contracts. See the case of Cunningham v. Cunningham, 690 P.2d 549 
(Utah 1984). The request for a continued injunction is both moot 
and not capable of being substantiated. In fact this Court should 
make a finding that the preliminary injunction was wrongful which 
will support Mr. Holbrook's appeals for affirmative relief set 
forth hereafter. 
VI. 
SUMMARY OF MR. HOLBROOKE ARGUMENTS ON APPEAL 
A. The Trial Court's failure to grant Mr. Holbrook's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment to require Firemaster to 
perform a fair and impartial accounting under the contracts was 
error in that there was no genuine question as to any material fact 
relative to Firemaster being paid approximately $158,000 under the 
contracts for general services which, among other services, 
included bookkeeping and accounting services. (See Plaintiff's 
Trial Exhibits 11 and 34). This was never rebutted at trial. 
Firemaster was assigned the receivables from all sales and service 
performed by Mr. Holbrook (as an example see Trial Exhibit 114), 
by the invoices used by the parties at all relevant times, which 
state in pertinent part as follows: 
"Seller hereby assigns this Account Receivable to Master 
Protection including all taxes" 
23 
Firemaster therefore had an obligation to account for and 
disburse such funds from these receivables to Mr. Holbrook under 
the contracts as well as under a fiduciary duty associated with the 
handling of such funds implied at law. (R. 42-46, 92-95, 148-151). 
By virtue of the Trial Court's denial of his motion, Mr. Holbrook 
was required to hire and pay his own accounting expert. Based on 
the jury's and Court's findings, Firemaster should now be ordered 
to pay all such costs. 
B. The Trial Court's decision to dismiss Mr. Holbrook's 
Utah State and Federal racketeering claims for relief on the basis 
of a choice of law provision in the contracts rather than based 
upon tort choice of law precedent, was clear reversible error. 
Tort law, rather than contract law should have been applied to the 
choice of law decision. If the Trial Court had done so, it would 
have found Utah law applied and denied the motion to dismiss. Such 
a decision requires a remand of such claims for further 
proceedings. The award of attorneys' fees to Firemaster as a 
result of such dismissal should also be vacated. 
C. The Trial Court's refusal at trial to permit the 
Plaintiff to put on evidence of lost profits relating to the 
wrongful imposition of an injunction, when that specific language 
had been included in the Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint, (R. 
1369), and where Firemaster had requested the injunction, been 
required to post a $75,000 bond if such injunction was found to be 
wrongful, and where the Court had ample evidence to support an 
award of the full bond to Mr. Holbrook was clear reversible error 
on the part of the Court. Mr. Holbrook should be awarded the 
$75,000 injunction bond since Firemaster already requested such 
bond amount based on its representation that $75,000 was Mr. 
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be permitted to request such damages from a new jury or the Court. 
D. The award to Mr. Holbrook of only $5,872.36 in 
punitive damages on his conversion cause of action was clear 
reversible error where the District Court refused to permit 
evidence of Firemaster's substantial net worth to go the jury. 
This clearly violates the criteria relating to punitive damages 
under Utah law. See Crookston, supra. In post-trial proceedings, 
the Court acknowledged there was error in the manner this issue was 
handled on the part of Plaintiff's Counsel, the Court and Defense 
counsel. (Tr. at R. 5796-99) and that the issue should be 
corrected. The correct result is to permit a new trial solely as 
to what is the correct amount of punitive damages to be charged 
against Firemaster. See the Utah case of Bundy v. Century 
Equipment Co., 692 P.2d 754 (Utah 1984). 
E. The Trial Court erred in refusing to grant 
Plaintiff's Motion for Directed Verdict and Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict, or Mr. Holbrook's Motion for 
Declaratory Relief on the issue that Mr. Holbrook should be 
relieved of any and all further obligations under the contracts 
after his termination in January of 1990, including the $10,000 
award to Firemaster. The Utah cases of Wright, supra. Kinsman, 
supra and Cunningham, supra all dictate such a result and to find 
otherwise was clear, reversible error by the Court. 
F. The Trial Court erred in refusing to award Mr. 
Holbrook his costs and attorneys fees as the prevailing party under 
the contracts. (See Plaintiff's Trial Exhibits, 1 pgs. 21 and 22, 
Exhibit 2, pgs. 22-23, and Exhibit 3, pgs. 22-23). 
The Trial Court also failed to award Mr. Holbrook his 
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Mountain States Broadcasting, supra. 
The Trial Court also should have awarded Mr. Holbrook his 
costs and attorneys fees under the provisions of Utah Code 
Annotated 78-27-5 6, where Firemaster was found to have breached its 
fiduciary duty to Mr. Holbrook, to have breached the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealings in contracts, and 
tortiously converted Mr. Holbrook's funds in a manner justifying 
the imposition of punitive damages. 
If Utah Code Annotated 7 8-27-5 6 has any validity under 
Utah law, it is an abuse of discretion to not apply it against 
Firemaster in this case. 
G. The District Court erred in requiring Mr. Holbrook 
to pay the sum $11,014. in cash, as an "equitable" payment to 
Firemaster for access to the confidential customer list. The Court 
cannot re-write the parties' contract by the use of equitable 
relief. See Cunningham, supra. Firemaster was not entitled to 
equitable relief from any Court by virtue of it's own willful and 
intentional tortious conduct toward Mr. Holbrook. 
VII. 
REPLY TO FIREMASTER'S ARGUMENTS 
A. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY 
REFUSING TO CONTINUE TRIAL OF THE CASE. 
Firemaster claimed that Mr. Holbrook's prejudicial 
failure to timely provide information allegedly vital to 
Firemaster's defenses should have caused the Court to grant it's 
motion for continuance of the Trial. 
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A very simple resolution exists of this issue. Counsel 
for Firemaster, because he believed his client was winning at trial 
and did not want to lose his momentum, twice waived the motion for 
a continuance by Stipulation, (Tr. at R. 5237-44, 5280-81). 
Therefore no error can be ascribed. Firemaster's Stipulation at 
trial clearly shows that this issue is meritless and should be 
summarily dismissed. 
The standard Firemaster must otherwise meet in claiming 
error is that the Trial Court abused it's discretion in failing to 
grant the continuance requested. State v. Humphreys 707 P.2nd 109 
(Utah 1985) . 
The record is clear that in this case the original 
accounting records were all in the possession of Firemaster. (R. 
42-46, 92-95, 148-151). Firemaster was paid approximately $158,000 
to maintain such records, perform bookkeeping services relating to 
and account for such funds. (Plaintiff's Trial Exhibits 11, 34 and 
see Section 8 of each of Plaintiff's Exhibits 1, 2 and 3). Fire-
master at all times was on notice and understood these records to 
be the critical exhibits for trial. See Defendant's Response to 
Plaintiff's Requests for Production of Documents. (R. 657-662, 858-
866) . 
Mr. Holbrook made a motion to the Court that Firemaster 
be required to perform an independent accounting on the funds it 
had received and was responsible for under the contracts. (R. 974-
991). The Court denied such motion but required Firemaster to 
provide access to those records when it had failed under previous 
document requests to adequately provide copies of the thousands of 
pages of records required in this case. (R. 1621-24). 
Firemaster took Mr. Holbrook's deposition on at least two 
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at those times but choose not to do so. (R. 546-48, 1653-54). 
The Court ordered of the parties that any documents not 
timely produced prior to trial would be inadmissable at trial. (R. 
4285-86). The documents complained about by Firemaster, the "A" 
documents, were not introduced as exhibits at trial and are not 
part of the record. In fact, Mr. Holbrook sought to have such 
documents suppressed under attorney-work product and other similar 
rules. (Tr. at R. 2629-41). 
No prejudicial error has occurred to Firemaster from the 
alleged failure to obtain the "A" documents complained about, 
since: 
1) Such documents were not introduced as exhibits at 
trial and are not a part of the record; 
2) Firemaster had an opportunity in pre-trial depositions 
to ask Mr. Holbrook and Mr. Miller the questions which were in 
essence what made up the "A" documents Firemaster is complaining 
about; 
3) Firemaster had all of the actual accounting records 
upon which Mr. Holbrook's and Mr. Miller's testimony were based, 
for years prior to trial; 
4) Firemaster chose not to do it's own independent 
accounting; 
5) Firemaster received one continuance prior to trial to 
prepare for an additional approximate one month; 
6) Firemaster twice accepted a second limited continuance 
by stipulation during the Trial to have an opportunity to further 
prepare for the cross-examination of Mr. Miller, rather than seek 
a longer continuance, in order to press it's perceived advantage; 
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8) Firemaster did have it's own expert review the 
documents in question and he provided detailed testimony attempting 
to counter the findings of Mr. Miller. 
Clearly no prejudice has occurred to Firemaster in terms 
of their ability to understand and critic the testimony of Mr. 
Holbrook and Mr. Miller. Firemaster had the transactional 
documents at all relevant times and it stipulated during trial to 
proceed based upon its perceived advantage. Firemaster took as its 
trial approach the same approach it had toward the accounting 
records it was paid $158,000 by Mr. Holbrook to account for, i.e., 
let's wait and see if we get caught! Now it has been caught by the 
jury, it wants to go back for a second chance to make things sound 
not so bad. The only abuse of discretion on this issue would be 
to support Firemaster's thinking in this regard. The Trial Court's 
refusal to grant any other continuance as argued by Firemaster was 
not an abuse of discretion under the standard of Humphreys, supra 
and is not reversible error specifically because Firemaster waived 
this claim. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO GRANT 
FIREMASTER A NEW TRIAL 
The premise to begin with in considering this issue is 
that there is a strong presumption in favor of a jury verdict. See 
Batty v. Mitchell, 575 P.2d 1040 (Utah 1978); Weber Basin Water 
Conservancy Dist. v. Skeen, 328 P.2d 730 (Utah 1958); Price-Orem 
Inv. Co. v. Rollins, Brown and Gunnell, Inc., 713 P.2d 55 (Utah 
1986). 
The case which is directly on point and should be controlling 
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decision in the case of Wright v. Westside Nursery (787 P.2d 508, 
Utah App. 1990). In the Wright case, this Court has already ruled 
on a similar fact situation where an employment agreement existed 
to employ the selling owner of a business as an employee for a 
particular period of time after the sale of the business to the new 
owner. The selling owner converted funds while so employed and was 
terminated, appropriately according to the jury, for conversion of 
funds belonging to the new owner. The terminated employee counter-
sued for breach of his employment agreement because of his 
termination and the jury found for him as well. The Trial Court 
in the Wright, supra case, faced the factually contradictory jury 
verdicts and made the prudent decision on the law, that the prior 
breaches of the employment agreement justified the termination of 
the employee, thus prohibiting the employee from relying upon the 
employment agreement for relief. The Court then set aside the 
award to the employee for wrongful termination,, 
The Court in the Wright, supra case, at page 517 
indicated that: 
"Thus we hold that the Court appropriately dismissed the 
wrongful termination claim since Wright had good cause, 
as a matter of law, to terminate Humphreys." 
At page 516 the Court stated: 
"It is a basic tenet of agency law that [a] principal is 
privileged to discharge before the time fixed by the 
contract of employment an agent who has committed such 
a violation of duty that his conduct constitutes a 
material breach of contract." 
Such a ruling should also apply to the principal agent 
(Franchisor/Franchisee) relationship in the extent case. 
In the case of Brigham v. Moon Lake Electrical Assn, 47 0 
P.2d 393 (Utah 1970) the Supreme Court considered the situation of 
30 
special verdicts that found the Plaintiff to have suffered damages 
and also be contributorily negligent. The Court held the special 
verdicts were not inconsistent and thereby void, since in special 
verdicts, the jury finds the facts and the court applies the law. 
That is what the Trial Court should have done in this instance, 
applied the law of Wright, supra and Kinsman, supra. 
In the Utah case of Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Const. 
Co. , 701 P.2d 1078 (Utah 1985), the Court indicated that if a party 
claims a verdict to be inconsistent it should object prior to 
dismissal of the jury, or it will be barred from raising the issue 
on appeal. Firemaster made no objection while the jury was present 
and should therefore be barred by its failure to object. 
In this case, the jury verdicts clearly found that during 
the critical time period of June, 1987 through January, 1990, Mr. 
Holbrook fulfilled all his obligations under all the contracts. 
(R. 2729-37). Similarly, the jury unanimously found that during the 
time period of June, 1987, through January, 1990, Firemaster 
breached all three contracts, tortiously converted funds belonging 
to Mr. Holbrook, breached their fiduciary duty to Mr. Holbrook, and 
breached their implied duty of good faith and fair dealing relating 
to those contracts to Mr. Holbrook. The Jury also found the acts 
of conversion by Firemaster justified the imposition of punitive 
damages against it. (R. 2743-45). Mr. Holbrook therefore had good 
cause, as a matter of law, for not continuing to honor any 
obligations under the contracts as of January, 1990, and 
thereafter. 
Question No. 4 in the special verdict form in favor of 
Firemaster (R. 2726-28) does not ask the specific question, did 
Mr. Holbrook breach the agreements referenced in the jury verdict? 
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provides the jury an opportunity to perhaps decide, that if Mr. 
Holbrook utilized the customer list in violation of the trade 
secret agreement, which was an exhibit at trial (Defendant's Trial 
Exhibit V), that is the basis for the jury's decision. Whether the 
special verdict form was misleading, or provided the jury the 
opportunity to make a decision independent, but not necessarily 
contradictory to, other findings of the jury, is a question not 
answered by the special verdicts and a question for the Court. 
Under any circumstance, based on the Wright, supra 
reasoning, and the duty of the Court to apply the law as set forth 
in Brigham, supra, the multiple, intentional and repeated prior 
breaches of all the agreements by Firemaster over a two and one-
half year period constitute legal justification for Mr. Holbrook 
to refuse to continue to perform his obligations under the 
contracts. The law of performance under contracts would be totally 
nonsensical if one party could intentionally and willfully breach 
the contract, could maliciously convert the funds of the other 
party to a contract, be caught, not resolve the problem and then 
still be able to require the injured party to perform under those 
very contracts that the converting and breaching party has treated 
with disdain. As stated in this Court's decision in the Kinsman, 
supra, case at page 213 "such a result will not be tolerated." See 
also Wright, supra and Cunningham, supra. 
This Court therefore should deal with Firemaster's 
request for a new trial by vacating the $10,000 award to Firemaster 
by answering the threshold legal question of how an innocent party 
to a breached contract should conduct himself or herself once the 
other party to such contract has breached the agreement. The 
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answer should be that no obligation exists to perform once the 
contract has been breached by the other side. Based on this 
answer, Firemaster is not entitled to a new trial as requested. 
C. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ENTERING JUDGMENT FOR 
$50,000 ON THE FRANCHISEE'S CLAIM FOR BREACH OF THE IMPLIED 
COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING AND IN NOT REQUIRING A 
REMITTITUR OF THAT AWARD AS A CONDITION TO NOT GRANTING A NEW 
TRIAL. 
1. The $50,000 Damage Award Is Supported By the Type of 
"Substantial Evidence" Required by Utah Law 
Regarding this particular claim, the appellant fails in 
its primary obligation to marshall the evidence as set forth in the 
cases of Price-Orem Inv. Co. v. Rollins, Brown & Gunnell, Inc., 713 
P.2d 55 (Utah 1986); State v. Larsen, 180 Utah Adv. Rep. 13 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1992); Zions v. Overthrust Oil & Gas Corp., 179 Utah Adv. 
Rep 10 (Utah 19 92), and Mountain States Broadcasting, supra. On 
the basis alone, these appellate claims are doomed. 
In the case of appeals of jury verdicts, in order to 
overturn such a verdict, the appellant must marshall the evidence 
in favor of the verdict and show, notwithstanding such marshalling 
of the evidence that the decision of the jury was unsupported by 
"substantial evidence". The act of arguing only selected evidence 
favorable to their position as Firemaster did on pages 30-35 of its 
brief, dooms the challenge of Firemaster and is cause for 
dismissal. See State v. Larsen, supra at 15. 
Notwithstanding Firemaster's failure to marshall the 
evidence, substantial evidence did exist for the finding by the 
jury that Firemaster had breached its implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing in a manner and in an amount well in excess 
of $50,000. 
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in marshalling the evidence, Firemaster should have 
referenced this Court to and argued why at least the evidence set 
forth below was allegedly not substantial enough for purposes of 
meeting the standard to support a jury verdict: 
1. Firemaster could not make up it's mind whether Mr. 
Holbrook continued to work under his independent contractor 
agreement or some other agreement after he entered into the 
franchise agreements on April 11, 1988. Firemaster clearly wanted 
Mr. Holbrook to be bound by the confidentiality provisions of the 
contracts which benefited Firemaster. On the other hand, 
Firemaster did not want to be bound by the commission provisions 
of such agreement and provided totally contradictory evidence among 
its own representatives on this issue. (Tr. at R. 4381, 4382-83, 
4736, 4737-41, 5714-16, 5716a-5719, Testimony of Bob Wiles, 5661-
64). Thus, Firemaster in fact treated the issues in such 
independent contractor agreement that protected them as at all 
times in effect, but the provisions in such contract that 
benefitted Mr. Holbrook as terminated. This specifically evidenced 
itself when Firemaster sought to unilaterally reduce Mr. Holbrook's 
travel allowance commission in this area from 25% to 15% (Tr. at 
R. 4430-32, 4452-53, 4462-63). This type of action on the part of 
Firemaster occurred repeatedly. 
2. Mr. Holbrook was informed that the purchase price of 
his franchise areas was based upon a dollar for dollar formula that 
meant for every dollar of sales generated in that particular area 
he would be charged $1 for the purchase price, yet he was never 
provided evidence of the dollar sales to substantiate this amount 
as he requested. (Tr. at R. 4393-94, 4402--02a). 
3. The documents Firemaster claims to be confidential 
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were the actual invoices generated from each sale or service. (As 
an example see Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 114). In order to 
correctly account for sales and services and identify the correct 
commission and charges, the invoices on those sales would be 
required to be reviewed in order to perform such accounting 
function. However, Firemaster refused to provide those invoices 
to their independent contractors and franchisees such as Mr. 
Holbrook. (Tr. at R. 4401-12, 4595), or to let them retain a copy. 
The IC's (independent contractors) and FO's (franchise owners) were 
totally at the mercy of Firemaster to account properly, and paid 
Firemaster a large sum for such "privilege" (R. 42-46, 92-95, 148-
151, Plaintiff's Trial Exhibits 11 and 34). 
4. Mr. Holbrook testified to multiple problems relating 
to sales and service commissions that were due him. (Tr. at R. 
4416-70). Firemaster never refuted such claims by any evidence. 
5. Robin Phillips, at all relevant times the principal 
agent for Firemaster, threatened to reduce Mr. Holbrook's 
commissions after the one year grace period in the contracts 
expired and stated that he could receive no more work, 
notwithstanding he had "purchased" such franchise areas, until he 
executed the schedule reducing his commissions. However, Robin 
Phillips refused to counter-sign the document on behalf of 
Firemaster because he said he didn't need to. See Trial Exhibits 
8, 9, and 10. (Tr. at R. 4517-20, 4756-57). 
6. Shaani Leary testified and corroborated Mr. 
Holbrook's testimony that he had been promised by Ron Bogardus, the 
Firemaster representative who sold the franchises to him, that Mr. 
Holbrook's commissions would stay the same by purchasing the 
franchise areas as under his independent contractor agreement.(Tr. 
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7 . Shaani Leary testified that she believed Firemaster's 
treatment of Bard Holbrook was unfair. (Tr. at R. 4668). 
8. Robin Phillips testified that all proceeds for all 
sales and services from all ICs and FOs went directly to 
Firemaster. (Tr. at R. 4693-95). Robin Phillips testified that it 
was not the Firemaster policy to give back corrections on sales 
summaries to the contractors and franchisees so they could review 
them for accuracy. (Tr. at R. 4700-01). Mr. Phillips testified 
that one must look at the invoices to see if the correct amount of 
commission is paid (Tr. at R. 4701-03), yet Firemaster claimed the 
invoices were confidential and refused to permit the ICs and FOs 
such as Mr. Holbrook to retain the invoices (Tr. at R. 4703). 
Therefore no procedure existed for Mr. Holbrook to verify the 
accuracy of the bookkeeping and accounting that he paid Firemaster 
to perform on his behalf; and trust only got him deeper in the 
hole. 
9. Firemaster had Mr. Holbrook perform services and paid 
commissions under a formula calculation which permitted them to 
earn a profit from sales taxes charged for the job. (Tr. at R. 
4710). Mr. Phillips referred to this profit as a "handling fee" 
(Tr. at R. 4710-11). 
10. Robin Phillips, the principal local manager at all 
relevant times of the Firemaster office for the State of Utah, 
testified in his deposition in 1990, after this litigation had been 
filed that at that time he still did not know why Firemaster 
received it's percentage from each of the invoices sold and 
serviced by Mr. Holbrook (Tr. at R. 4715-16). This lack of 
knowledge indicates he did not know why Mr. Holbrook paid 
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Firemaster $158,000. How could Firemaster, under Mr. Phillips 
direction, then provide the services it contracted for but did not 
know it had an obligation to do? 
11. Mr. Phillips testified as to problems relating to 
pricing of parts (Tr. at R. 4717-22). Mr. Phillips also testified 
pursuant to Trial Exhibit 13, as to what the basis was for 
Firemaster charging a "extra materials charge" (Tr. at R. 4723-2 8 
and Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 13). Such computation is not 
contained in the contracts, was not agreed to by Mr. Holbrook and 
clearly shows bad faith. It is also contradicted by Mr. Bob Wiles 
of Firemaster, the general manager of the entire company in 
Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 14. 
12. Mr. Phillips verified that even though Firemaster 
was paid to perform accounting and bookkeeping services, they did 
not make any effort to verify the price of parts on invoices and 
thus charged Mr. Holbrook the highest price available. (Tr. at R. 
4732-36). 
13. Mr. Phillips admitted there were problems in keeping 
track of lead sheets and paying the appropriate commissions to Mr. 
Holbrook for such leads, notwithstanding the fact that Firemaster 
was paid substantial sums of money to do so. (Tr. at R. 4742-44). 
14. Mr. Phillips admitted Firemaster had no bookkeeping 
procedure to keep track of commissions to be paid to Mr. Holbrook 
for second annual inspections which were due him, and for which 
Firemaster was paid to account. (Tr. at R. 4745-4746). 
15. Firemaster admitted that it was receiving a 
substantial proportion of each invoice to provide advertising 
services for it's franchisees and independent contractors, on sales 
of almost 1,800,000 in 1989. Yet for that year it only paid 
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;>z,ooo. /B tor advertising notwithstanding receipt from Mr, Holbrook 
alone approximately of in excess of $100,000 in that year for 
general services including advertising. (Tr. at R. 4748-50). See 
also Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 15. 
16. Mr. Arthur Miller was the sole independent person 
to review the eleven volumes of accounting records comprising in 
excess of 4,000 Exhibits and found that seven types of exceptions 
existed as to how Mr. Holbrook should have been paid under the 
contracts but was not. (Tr. at R. 4768-4780A, 5258-81, 5585-98). 
See also Trial Exhibits 22-31 and 32. 
17. Mr. Miller testified that there were three specific 
methods of material overcharges that were used over time to take 
ever increasing sums of money from Mr. Holbrook's commissions in 
violation of the contracts and in a manner that had he not 
terminated his contracts, would have caused him to suffer a pro 
rata greater loss over time than had previously been forced upon 
him by Firemaster. He determined this solely by going through 
these voluminous records. No one from Firemaster ever did this. 
(Tr. at R. 5266-79). In other words, the more money Mr. Holbrook 
was making, the more he would have been losing over time based upon 
Firemaster's actions. 
18. Mr. Miller testified that the exceptions to the way 
that Mr. Holbrook should have been paid were done on a consistent 
basis, thus indicating an intentional pattern, on the part of 
Firemaster. (Tr. at R. 5275). See also Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 
32 which is the report of Arthur Miller. 
19. Mr. Miller testified to a wrongful method of 
rounding percentages in every calculation in favor of Firemaster, 
which although the dollar amount would not be significant regarding 
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one independent contractor or franchisee such as Mr. Holbrook, over 
many individuals it would be a substantial sum of money. (Tr. at 
R. 5593, 5596-97). 
20. Alaina Coffman testified that Robin Phillips 
instructed her not to provide Mr. Holbrook any work unless he 
signed the commission modification, Plaintiff's Trial Exhibits 8 
and 9. (Tr. at R. 5 615-16) even though Mr. Holbrook was current in 
his work. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 10). 
21. Ms. Coffman corroborated there was no accounting 
method of Firemaster to account for commission payments to Mr. 
Holbrook for second annual inspections (Tr. at R. 5616-17) even 
though he had been promised such commissions by contract and 
Firemaster was paid to do accounting for Mr. Holbrook. 
22. Alaina Coffman testified she was instructed to never 
to point out or correct errors against the accounts of the 
independent contractors and franchisees such as Mr. Holbrook, but 
only to correct those that were against Firemaster and would 
therefore result in an advantage to Firemaster. (Tr. at R. 5 619-
20) . 
23. Ms. Coffman further testified she was informed it 
was the job of the independent contractor or franchisee to catch 
any errors, notwithstanding Firemaster retained the critical 
accounting documents, and was paid a substantial sum from each 
invoice to perform bookkeeping and accounting services. (Tr. at R. 
5620). 
24. Ms. Coffman and Robin Phillips had a conversation 
after she had determined that there were errors in the manner in 
which commissions were being paid Mr. Holbrook and others, where 
she was instructed that Firemaster would not go back to fix past 
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prooiems relating to commissions unless caught and brought up by 
the independent contractor or franchisee. (Tr. at R. 5623). 
25. Ms. Coffman was instructed by Robin Phillips that 
if she gave Mr. Holbrook the higher commission he was entitled to 
under the agreements, to make up the loss of income to Firemaster 
by charging him an extra materials charge. (Tr. at R. 5624). 
26. Ms. Coffman was informed if she could not identify 
a part sold on an invoice of Mr. Holbrook's, rather than to clarify 
the issue with Mr. Holbrook, to charge him the highest price for 
the part even though Firemaster was paid substantial sums to do Mr. 
Holbrook's bookkeeping and accounting. (Tr. at R. 5626). 
27. Ms. Coffman was told by Mr. Phillips to charge the 
extra materials charge for parts replaced through the All Risk 
Insurance Program. In such All Risk Insurance Program, Mr. 
Holbrook provided parts he had purchased from Firemaster to 
customers free of charge to the customer as a result of their prior 
purchase of the All Risk Insurance. Mr. Holbrook was then to be 
reimbursed the parts at no charge from Firesmaster. However, 
Firemaster then charged Mr. Holbrook the extra materials charge for 
parts for which he could not charge the customer, thus resulting 
in a loss to him. (Tr. at R. 5630-32). 
28. Mr. Ron Bogardus testified there were benefits to 
the ownership of the franchise, that by ownership, the customers 
belong to the franchisee. (Tr. at R. 5375-77). Then, he 
contradicted himself and stated the contracts make the accounts 
Firemaster's. Firemaster contended through the entire trial that 
the customers were Firemaster's confidential customers, in complete 
contradiction of the alleged benefit on ownership as set forth by 
Mr. Bogardus. 
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29. The jury was informed by Mr. Arthur Miller, Mr. 
Holbrook's accounting expert, that Firemaster had underpaid and 
overcharged Mr. Holbrook the sum of $37,513.98. See Trial Exhibit 
32. 
30. Plaintiff testified that he had paid Firemaster 
$158,206.00 for general services, including bookkeeping and 
accounting services and advertising. (Trial Exhibits No. 11, 34). 
31. It was stipulated and admitted, that Firemaster 
intentionally and unilaterally altered the terms of the rural Utah 
franchise contract (Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit 3) regarding 
commissions earned by Mr. Holbrook in the Brigham City area. (Tr. 
at R. 5198-99). 
32. Tom Kennedy, the corporate representative of 
Firemaster who negotiated the independent contractor agreement with 
Mr. Holbrook on behalf of Firemaster, testified he promised Mr. 
Holbrook certain commissions. (Tr. at R. 5074-94). Later Robin 
Phillips, the district manager for Firemaster in Salt Lake City 
sought to unilaterally modify such commissions. (Plaintiff's Trial 
Exhibits 8 and 9). 
33. Mr. Arthur Miller testified that while he could not 
state there definitely was fraud in the transactions, his failure 
to so state was only as result of not being able to review all the 
documents he needed to come to such a conclusion. (Tr. at R. 5272-
79) . 
In its brief, Firemaster failed to marshall any of the 
above cited evidence to the Court, failed to argue any of the 
evidence testified to that Mr. Miller found in the 4,000 plus 
accounting exhibits, (Plaintiff's Trial Exhibits 101-4182), and 
failed to show how such accounting exhibits do not prove an 
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taking from the accounts of Mr. Holbrook. 
The total failure to marshall the evidence by Firemaster, 
and address any or all of the issues set forth above, coupled with 
Mr. Holbrook's evidence of payment to Firemaster of $158,206 for 
its general services, including advertising, bookkeeping and 
accounting, of $11,836 in franchise fee purchase payments and the 
$37,513 testified to by Mr. Miller, clearly shows that there was 
substantial evidence to support a jury award to Mr. Holbrook of 
$50,000 on the claim of breach of the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing in contracts. Utah law is clear that once 
a claim has been presented to a jury and a verdict has been 
rendered, all presumptions are in favor of the validity of the 
verdict and judgment. See Joseph v. W.H. Grow, 348 P.2d 935 (Utah 
1960) . 
Further, under Utah law, after a jury trial, a 
presumption arises that any judgment resulting therefrom should not 
be disturbed unless the one attacking it meets the requirements of 
showing that any error complained of is substantial and 
prejudicial, so much so that the trial result would have been 
different is the error was corrected. See Hall v. Blackman, 417 
P. 2d 6 64 (Utah 19 6 6); Bowden v. Denver and R.G. W. R.R., 28 6 P. 2d 
240 (Utah 1955); Batt v. State, 503 P.2d 855 (Utah 1972). 
In the case of Batty v. Mitchell, 575 P.2d 1040 (Utah 
1978), the Court held that the amount of the verdict was an 
exclusive matter for the jury and unless the amount awarded clearly 
indicates the disregard of competent evidence, or the influence of 
passion or prejudice, such award must stand. See also Meyer v. 
Bartholomew, 690 P.2d 558 (Utah 1984). 
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referenced standards for setting aside the jury's verdicts. 
Substantial evidence in fact exists to support the jury's verdict 
and their appeal is thus doomed. Therefore, the verdict of $50,000 
to Mr. Holbrook, as supported by the evidence cited above, must be 
affirmed. 
2. Firemaster's Argument That the Jury's Own Special 
Verdicts, Granting an Award of $5,891.35 To the Franchisee for the 
Franchisor's Breach of Contract Claims Set the Outer Limit on the 
Total Amount of Damages Recoverable on those Claims is Erroneous. 
This argument is totally unsupported by law and is 
erroneous. Not only did Firemaster fail in its' appellant brief 
to marshall evidence to support this claim, it cannot and did not 
point to any specific rule of law that supports its' argument. The 
reason it cannot is because no such rule of law exists. 
Clearly, as an independent cause of action, the implied 
covenant of fair dealing and good faith in contracts carries it's 
own right of damages. See Rio Algom Corp. v. Jimco LTD, 618 P.2d 
497 (Utah 1980). The jury which heard all the evidence has the 
right to assess the evidence and make a determination as to the 
correct amount of damages. See Joseph, supra. 
Firemaster totally failed in it's burden to marshall the 
evidence to show the support if any, for the jury award. 
Firemaster did exactly what appellants do when they are unhappy 
with well-substantiated jury awards against them. They have 
attempted to marshall their evidence (see Appellants Brief, pages 
34-35), while ignoring the well founded rule as described in the 
Utah cases cited above of Price-Orem Inv. Co., supra: State v. 
Larsen, supra; and Zions, supra., which indicate that an 
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position and the failure to marshall the evidence against their 
position dooms their appeal. 
Where multiple special verdicts are submitted to the 
jury, the jury was given the right to choose to compensate Mr. 
Holbrook through his breach of contract claims and in other 
respects through the multiple breaches of the implied duty of good 
faith and fair dealing in contracts as supported by the 
"substantial evidence" requirement set forth above. 
The real issue Firemaster should be asking is, was there 
a double recovery to Mr. Holbrook? This clearly is not permitted. 
See Brigham City Sand and Gravel v. Machinery Center, Inc., et.al. , 
613 P.2d 510 (Utah 1980). Mr. Holbrook testified that his damages 
totaled $207,546.00 under three different types of loss. 
(Plaintiff's Trial Exhibits 11 and 34). He only received $85,000 
in compensatory damages. Therefore no double recovery has 
occurred. 
As stated in the Utah case of Bastian v. King, 661 P.2d 
953 (Utah 1983), at page 956: 
"Although an award of damages based only on speculation cannot 
be upheld, it is generally recognized that some degree of 
uncertainty in the evidence of damages will not suffice to 
relieve a defendant from recompensing a wronged Plaintiff. 
As long as there is some rational basis for a damage award, 
it is the wrongdoer who must assume the risk of some 
uncertainty." 
A rational basis does exist for the $50,000 award to Mr. 
Holbrook. The jury clearly believed services Firemaster was paid 
to perform, either were not in whole, or in part performed. The 
jury also believed such actions to be in bad faith! In order to 
right the wrong, the jury awarded Mr. Holbrook damages, but less 
than one-third of the amount he requested. This award is 
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substantiated by the evidence and not limited by the existence or 
alternative forms of relief, so long as no double recovery 
occurred. 
3. The Trial Court Should Not Have Required Mr. Holbrook 
to Remit the $50,000.00 Damage Award as a Condition to Denying 
Firemaster's Motion for a New Trial. 
A remittitur is only permitted if the jury award is 
obviously above any reasonable appraisal of the damages suffered. 
Ruf v. Assoc, for World Travel Exchange, 351 P.2d 623 (Utah 
1960) 
Mr. Holbrook submitted a memorandum in opposition to this 
same argument to the Trial Court (R. 4183-89). The Trial Court 
did not abuse it's discretion in refusing to require the remittitur 
or grant the new trial. That is the standard this Court must look 
to on this issue. See Batty, supra. The decision was clearly 
based upon the Trial Court's independent judgment after hearing all 
the evidence, declaring an independent termination of Mr. 
Holbrook's obligations (Tr. at R. 4844-46) and finding that the 
jury verdicts were fair and the product of a fair trial (Tr. at R. 
5821). Firemaster again failed to marshall any evidence to show 
that the award was excessive or not supported by substantial 
evidence and this Court's review should clearly be limited to a 
review of whether Judge Brian abused his discretion. See Batty, 
supra. 
Mr. Holbrook's accounting expert testified to $37,513.98 
in actual accounting losses to Mr. Holbrook, which losses would 
have continued and increased if he did not terminate his contracts. 
Mr. Holbrook testified to having been charged $158,206 for services 
that were totally or substantially not rendered and $11,876 for 
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actions. Mr. Holbrook did not receive a total award of $207,546 
but only a total award of $91,807. The jury award was less by half 
of the damage amount requested by Mr. Holbrook. To claim that to 
refuse to require such a remittitur was an abuse of discretion 
regarding award is unsupported by the evidence. 
The complexity of multiple claims for relief and having 
those claims submitted to a jury by multiple special verdicts with 
the prospect of relief being awarded under alternate theories, 
should not be cause for error to Mr. Holbrook so long as no double 
recovery has occurred. See Brigham City Sand and Gravel, supra. 
It is clear the jury chose to award Mr. Holbrook damages under 
different theories of relief for the actions of Firemaster during 
the period of June 1987 to January 1990. 
Mr. Holbrook received compensatory damages of $30,032.71, 
under his claim for conversion plus punitive damages of $5,872.36. 
He received $5,891.35 for his breach of contract claims. He 
received $1.00 for his breach of fiduciary duty claim, and $50,000 
for his claim of breach of the implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing. These damages could have all been awarded as part 
of the breach of contract claims and there would be no claim by 
Firemaster of an excessive or duplicative award. This is 
especially true where Mr. Holbrook testified to damages of $207,546 
(Plaintiff's Trial Exhibits 11 and 34). When the award is split 
among various claims for relief, but is not duplicative, it is not 
excessive or even erroneous. 
It is interesting to note that Mr. Robert Minor, the jury 
foreman is an attorney. Another of the jurors was an accountant. 
If such an educated jury could not avoid awarding duplicate relief 
46 
when faced with multiple special verdict forms, it is not likely 
any jury could. 
Only an excessive or duplicative award based upon the 
jury misapplying the facts or law, or failing to take into account 
proven facts, or making findings clearly against the weight of the 
evidence should be cause for a remittitur. See Wellman v. Noble, 
366 P.2d 701 (Utah 1961). Where Firemaster failed again to 
marshall the evidence in support of its position, this Court has 
no basis to determine if Judge Brian abused his discretion in 
denying this motion of Firemaster, and therefore its appeal is 
doomed. See State v. Larsen, supra at 15. 
D. FIREMASTER IS NOT THE "PREVAILING PARTY" ON THE 
PARTIES' BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIMS FOR PURPOSES OF RECOVERING IT'S 
ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
This Court should answer the threshold legal question in 
the case by striking the $10,000 award to Firemaster under the 
Wright, supra and Kinsman, supra precedents, and this issue would 
be disposed of easily against Firemaster. 
As set forth in each contract, Plaintiff's Exhibits 1,2 
and 3, Firemaster provided would be reimbursed all its costs and 
attorneys fees if it was forced to enforce any breaches of the 
agreements. Both Utah and California law make this obligation 
mutual. (R. 3195-3350). See Utah Code Annotated 78-27-56.5 which 
states: 
"A court may award costs and attorney's fees to either 
party that prevails in a civil action based upon any 
promissory note, written contract or other writing 
executed after April 29, 1986, when the provision of the 
promissory note, written contract, or other writing allow 
at least one party to recover attorney's fees." 
See also West's annotated California Civil Code Section 1717, a 
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herein by this reference. 
Based on the contracts and the above referenced statutes, 
Mr. Holbrook is entitled to his costs and attorneys fees for having 
to enforce the contracts against Firemaster. Mr. Holbrook honored 
all his contracts for two and one-half years. Only after he could 
endure Firemaster's abuses no longer did he cease to honor the 
contracts. Such honor by Mr. Holbrook should be recognized and 
rewarded by this Court. Conversely, the lack of honor by 
Firemaster should be penalized by an award of costs and attorneys' 
fees to Mr. Holbrook. 
However, if the Court were to look at the situation as 
argued under the case of Mountain States Broadcasting Co., supra, 
where the party in whose favor the "net" judgment is entered 
becomes the prevailing party, it is clear that Mr. Holbrook was the 
"net" prevailing party in this case. His damages were $91,000, 
all as a result of actions of Firemaster during the existence of 
the contracts for sales and services of Mr. Holbrook while 
operating under the contracts. Even if Firemaster retains it's 
$10,000 judgment, Mr. Holbrook clearly is the "net winner"and 
should have been awarded his costs and attorneys' fees. 
Once this Court addresses the threshold legal question 
as set forth in the Wright, supra case and vacates the jury's award 
to Firemaster for $10,000 for breach of the confidentiality 
provisions of the contracts as a result of its prior intentional, 
willful and malicious breaches, this issue is resolved. Once the 
Court vacates such award, it is unquestioned that Mr. Holbrook was 
the "prevailing party" under Utah and California law and should be 
entitled to an award of his costs and attorneys' fees. The matter 
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then should be remanded to the Trial Court to assess the 
appropriate amount of costs and attorneys' fees payable to Mr. 
Holbrook based upon the language of the contracts. 
E. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO ENFORCE 
THE NOTES AGAINST THE FRANCHISEE. 
Firemaster should be forced by this Court to answer if 
it has resold the territories that are the subject of the purchase 
by the notes. If Firemaster has this is a moot issue. It is also 
likely moot because Firemaster has the territories back under any 
circumstance and can or has resold such territories. Firemaster 
claims Mr. Holbrook received a benefit, i.e., performing under 
their name, yet Mr. Holbrook testified to $11,826 in franchise fee 
payments that he was not reimbursed by the jury. (Plaintiff's 
Trial Exhibits 11 and 34). Now Firemaster claims Mr. Holbrook 
received a double benefit and should pay the full $110,000. 
Firemaster has reacquired its territories. If those 
territories are sold on a dollar for dollar basis as they were to 
Mr. Holbrook, they are now worth $200,000 to Firemaster based on 
Firemaster's thinking. Firemaster has not been damaged by the 
reacquisition of such territories. 
The Trial Court was requested by Firemaster in post-trial 
motions to enforce these notes against Mr. Holbrook. (R. 335 6-84, 
3402-27). Firemaster has this fantasy that it can intentionally, 
willfully and maliciously take commissions from it's independent 
contractor and franchisee and still have a Court of law or equity 
require the other party live up to the obligations of the contracts 
Firemaster intentionally ignored. The boldness with which 
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is the very attitude that convinced the jury at trial that 
Firemaster is a predatory company that should be obligated to pay 
punitive damages. It is the very attitude that convinced the Trial 
Court to refuse to grant Firemaster's demand for payment of the 
notes and why this Court should soundly deny all Firemaster's 
appeals and affirm all awards against Firemaster so that Firemaster 
will recognize that it is exactly what the jury found it to be, 
i.e. a thief. 
Firemaster has no right to request payment on notes when 
the jury found that Mr. Holbrook lived up to all his obligations 
under the contracts and Firemaster breached all three agreements. 
(R. 2729-37). These contracts were structured to continue 
perpetually. (Plaintiff's Trial Exhibits 1,2 and 3). No evidence 
was presented that Mr. Holbrook had failed to pay the payments on 
the notes during the existence of the contracts. Firemaster now 
wants payment for years into the future for the purchase of an 
asset they wrongfully took back into their possession. Where is 
their showing of diminished value? There was no evidence to suggest 
they do not currently possess the value of the notes and therefore 
they have incurred no loss. 
On the other hand, Firemaster does not offer to grant Mr. 
Holbrook the territories covered by the notes and an exclusive 
right to fo after all customers in those territories in 
Firemaster's name in exchange for payment on their notes. Mr. 
Bogardus indicated the real value of the franchise from 
Firemaster's point of view was the ownership of the customers. 
Firemaster has that in its name as much as any other competitor. 
Mr. Holbrook does not seek to service the customers in the 
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territories in Firemaster's name. (Tr. at R. 5375-77) Now 
Firemaster wants payment on the notes and the customers in 
Firemaster's name as well. Firemaster is so used to having all the 
benefits and performing poorly or not at all on its obligations 
from its adhesive contracts, it does not recognize when to stop its 
predatory behavior. 
Firemaster's own intentional breaches of all three 
agreements serve to estop Firemaster from either demanding or 
collecting payment under the notes. The jury found that to be the 
case in its special verdicts.(R. 2729-37, 2759-60). In Mr. 
Holbrook's separate post-trial request for declaratory relief, 
Judge Brian independently came to the same conclusion. (Tr. at R. 
4844-46). 
Notwithstanding the jury's and Trial Court's separate, 
yet identical conclusions, after hearing the evidence, that 
Firemaster was not entitled to payment on the notes, Firemaster 
continues to insist that it should somehow receive payment for 
notes it would have received had it not breached the contracts. 
If Firemaster had been paid in cash for the territories rather than 
by notes, under the circumstances as found by the Court and jury 
in this case, Mr. Holbrook would be entitled to a complete 
reimbursement for such fees. What Firemaster was selling in 
exchange for the notes, was not customers, but a territory in its 
name. See Plaintiff's (Trial Exhibits 2 and 3 page 5, R. 80-81, 
135-136. It can sell the territories again to recover any loss. 
Firemaster is simply not entitled to receive payment on the notes 
given the circumstances of this case based upon Firemaster's own 
actions. 
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PREJUDICIALLY ALLOW THE FRANCHISEE TO URGE THE JURORS TO PLACE 
THEMSELVES IN THE FRANCHISEE'S SHOES TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE 
FRANCHISEE SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO HONOR HIS CONTRACTS. 
Of all the cases cited by Firemaster to support its' 
argument on this issue, none are Utah cases. No Utah law exists 
on point on this issue from the research of both sides. 
In each of the cases cited by Firemaster, the alleged 
attempt of counsel to inflame the passion and prejudice of the 
jurors by placing themselves in the injured party's shoes was not 
found to be reversible error even though it was stated that such 
action could be found to be reversible error. 
In fact, the specific argument that was objected to by 
Firemaster went to the issue of whether or not there was duress 
imposed upon Mr. Holbrook to force him to enter into the contracts. 
(Tr. at R. 5477-8). In the special verdict on that issue (R. 2759, 
Question 1) the jury answered No, when asked if Mr. Holbrook was 
required to enter into the two franchise purchase contracts under 
duress. Therefore, notwithstanding any alleged violation of the 
"golden rule", the jury was not influenced to find for Mr. Holbrook 
on the specific point which would have been influenced by the 
conduct complained of by Firemaster. This is but another example 
of Firemaster alleging error frivolously. 
Firemaster failed to marshall the evidence to show that 
the jury results could only be based on passion and prejudice. 
Therefore, their appeal fails as a matter of lav/. Price-Orem Dev. 
Inc. , supra, and State v. Larsen, supra. The fact that Firemaster 
prevailed on the very issue complained of shows the predatory 
nature of Firemaster in this case and its actions to bankrupt Mr. 
Holbrook with frivolous but expensive legal action. It should show 
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tactics, it is Firemaster. 
G. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT IMPROPERLY REFUSE TO MAKE 
PERMANENT THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION. 
For the reasons set forth above and pursuant to the 
Wright, supra and Kinsman, supra cases the Trial Court did not err 
in failing to make the preliminary injunction permanent. In fact, 
the preliminary injunction was clearly a wrongfully entered 
injunction given the jury findings that Mr. Holbrook had fulfilled 
his obligations under the contracts between June of 19 87 and July 
of 1990 and that Firemaster breached all three agreements. No 
other explanation can exist in the case! (R. 2729-37). 
Regarding the Court's decision to require an "equitable" 
payment for access to the confidential customer list, Mr. Holbrook 
argued that Firemaster was not entitled by its' actions to any form 
of equitable relief. Such arguments were set forth in Mr. 
Holbrook's memorandum below. (R. 3510-18). The arguments set forth 
therein are incorporated by this reference. Mr. Holbrook set forth 
below that Firemaster's actions prohibited any Court from extending 
to it equitable relief. See Battistone v. American Land and Dev. 
Co., 607 P.2d 837 (Utah 1980) and Bradford v. Alvey and Sons, 621 
P.2d 1240 (Utah 1980). This same reasoning applies to this 
appellate issue raised by Firemaster. 
If Firemaster is entitled to a permanent injunction given 
the facts of this case, Mr. Holbrook respectfully requests this 
Court to explain in detail the legal reasoning of how a party that 
is found to have tortiously converted the funds of another, having 
breached the contracts that provide the basis for injunctive 
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breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
regarding the contracts to the other contracting party and having 
been found liable for punitive damages for its willful and 
intentional acts can come before a Court of equity in the State of 
Utah with "clean hands, *' and therefore be entitled to equitable 
relief. 
Firemaster is not entitled to a continuation of the 
injunction and in fact Mr. Holbrook should have been entitled to 
put on evidence, as he requested and as set forth below, of his 
damages as a result of the wrongful imposition of the injunction 
and should be permitted to have that amount determined and awarded 
to him. 
VIII. 
CROSS-APPEAL ARGUMENTS 
A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT MR. 
HOLBROOK'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT REQUESTING 
FIREMASTER TO BE REQUIRED TO PERFORM AND PAY FOR A FAIR AND 
IMPARTIAL ACCOUNTING UNDER THE CONTRACTS. 
Since this issue was decided by the Trial Court by way 
of motion for summary judgment, it is a question of law that is 
reviewed for correctness. The reviewing Court need not ascribe any 
weight to the findings of the Trial Court,, See Jones v. Bountiful 
City, 187 Utah Adv. Rep. 23 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Pursuant to Sections 8(c), 8(d) and 8(e) of each of the 
contracts, Plaintiff's Trial Exhibits 1, 2, and 3 entered into 
between the parties, all of the proceeds of all sales and service 
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performed under the contracts were specifically assigned to 
Firemaster. The customers were to remit payment directly to the 
Firemaster offices. This language can be reviewed on each invoice 
in the accounting Trial Exhibits 101-4182. (See an example at 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 114.) The specific language on the invoice 
used by Firemaster is: 
"Seller hereby assigns this Account Receivable to Master 
Protection Including All Taxes" 
Firemaster was then responsible by contract to receive the money, 
perform accounting and bookkeeping services relating to the 
account, pursuant to contract as set forth therein, regarding the 
funds so received and disburse the appropriate and correct sums to 
Mr. Holbrook. Firemaster received in excess of $158,000 for these 
services. Firemaster kept the critical invoices as confidential 
documents and would not permit Mr. Holbrook to have them. H 
therefore e could not even perform his own accounting. (Tr. at R. 
4401-12, 4595, 4693-95, 4700-1, 4701-3). 
In the event that Mr. Holbrook received cash, he was to 
turn that cash immediately over to Firemaster so that it could be 
accounted for in the same process as payments mailed to the 
Firemaster office. (See section 4-8 of Plaintiff's Trial Exhibits 
1, 2 and 3.) 
As a result of the Firemaster procedure set forth by the 
contracts, as drafted by Firemaster, Firemaster was in complete 
control of the proceeds of all sales and service, in control of all 
critical documentation, and in control of all bookkeeping and 
accounting pertaining to receipt of income and the distribution of 
such income between the parties. 
As set forth in the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
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Mr. Holbrook requested of the Court that Firemaster be required to 
perform and pay for a fair and impartial accounting. Firemaster's 
only response was to argue its interpretation of its 
responsibilities under the contracts (R. 1409-13). The clear rule 
of contract interpretation is to attempt to construe a contract in 
conformance with the intent of the parties, and if that fails to 
construe the contract against the drafter. See Atlas Corp v. 
Clovis National Bank 737 P.2d 225 (Utah 1987); Sears v. Reimersma, 
655 P. 2d 1105 (Utah 1982); and Parks Enterprises, Inc. v. New 
Century Realty, Inc. 652 P.2d 918 (Utah 1982). 
The Trial Court refused to grant Mr. Holbrook's Motion 
for an accounting and Mr. Holbrook was required to hire his own 
accounting expert to perform an independent accounting of the 
monetary affairs between the parties, for which the Trial Court 
unbelievably has not required Firemaster to pay. 
When the accuracy of the bookkeeping and accounting 
services of Firemaster was called into question, and when 
Firemaster was the party that had actual physical control of the 
funds, of all financial paperwork concerning invoicing for, receipt 
of, and distribution of income and was specifically paid for such 
services by contract, there is no material question of fact but 
that Firemaster should have been responsible to perform and pay for 
a fair and impartial accounting of the affairs between the parties. 
To not order such, was clear reversible error by the Trial Court. 
Now that Mr. Holbrook has paid for such accounting, the 
practical solution is to find that Firemaster is liable for all 
costs relating to Mr. Holbrook's independent accounting in this 
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B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING FIREMASTER'S MOTION 
TO DISMISS MR. HOLBROOK'S STATE AND FEDERAL RACKETEERING CLAIMS. 
Firemaster filed repeated Rule 12(b)(6) motions to 
dismiss the Utah State and Federal Racketeering claims brought by 
Mr. Holbrook. The Trial Court eventually dismissed those 
racketeering claims based upon its finding that the contracts 
between the parties stated that California law applied (R. 1671-
74, 1675-76. See also Tr. at R. 5174-91). 
The standard for review this Court must look at is one 
of reviewing the decision for correctness, since the decision was 
one of the Trial Court on a motion to dismiss and the reviewing 
Court should not ascribe any particular weight to the findings of 
the Trial Court. See Jones, supra. 
The Trial Court provided Mr. Holbrook several 
opportunities to amend his complaint, which opportunities he 
utilized. (R* 667-701, 1298-1399). It is the position of Mr. 
Holbrook that he fully and completely stated a sufficient claim for 
purposes of avoiding a motion to dismiss by Firemaster under both 
the Utah State racketeering statute and the Federal racketeering 
statute. (R. 1332-65). 
The basis of the Trial Court's decision was that 
California law applied and that since no claim for relief under a 
California racketeering statute was pled, the Utah and Federal 
claims should be dismissed. Racketeering claims are basically tort 
claims. They are not contract claims. Under the law of tort claims 
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"cnere are wen esrannsnea rules relating to the law of which forum 
applies. 
A "tort" under Utah law is a legal wrong committed by one 
against the person or property of another and is a violation of 
duty imposed by law. Kimiko Toma v. Utah Power & Light Co. 3 65 
P.2d 788 (Utah 1959). 
Utah law was not found on the issue of whether Utah 
follows the general rule regarding choice of law provisions 
relating to "torts". Other states are clear on this issue. 
In the Washington case of Haberman v. Washington Public 
Power Supply System, 744 P.2d 1032 (Wash. 1987), the Court there 
held that the choice of law in a contract does not govern tort 
actions arising out of contracts. The choice of law in the 
contract may be considered as one of the elements in the most 
significant relationship test used in tort cases. 
This most significant relationship concept is the general 
rule which mandates that the first step in choice of law cases is 
to have the Court evaluate the contacts with each interested 
jurisdiction according to their relative importance to the issue. 
The underlying facts of the case is the most important issue. See 
Southwell v. Widing Transp., Inc., 676 P.2d 477 (Wash. 1984). 
Under each of the significant contracts and underlying 
facts in this case, a Utah Court should clearly find that Utah law 
applied. The contracts between the parties were executed in Salt 
Lake City. The operation of the independent contractor and 
franchise areas occurred primarily in the State of Utah. The 
majority of the witnesses were in the State of Utah. All of the 
accounting records were in the State of Utah. The damage to Mr. 
Holbrook occurred in the State of Utah. All funds were handled in 
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Utah. The law of Utah should apply to the racketeering claims of 
Mr. Holbrook rather that the law of the State of California. 
However, as argued to Judge Brian prior to his ruling 
dismissing the racketeering claims, California law would reach the 
same conclusion. In the case of Doyle v. the United States, 530 
F.Supp. 1278 (Cent. Dist. of Calif. 1982) a California Court found 
the same criteria to be applicable as set forth above for 
determining which law to apply to tort claims. In the Doyle, supra 
case, the California Court found that Louisiana law applied based 
upon the application of the same criteria regarding the significant 
relationships to the case. If those same criteria are applied in 
the extant case, even under California law, the racketeering law 
of the State of Utah would be applied rather than that of 
California. 
The existence of a Federal racketeering claim being 
dismissed on the basis that California Law applied makes absolutely 
no sense under any applicable rule of law. In fact, the 
jurisdictional requirements of the Federal racketeering statute 
mandate that elements of the action must have occurred across state 
boundaries in order to qualify as a Federal racketeering cause of 
action. (R. 1356-65). Such cause of action therefore pre-supposes 
that multiple states will be involved and Federal law will apply. 
To permit the language of a contract to be the sole 
grounds to dictate the choice of law relating to tortious or 
racketeering actions between those parties is very simply 
reversible error. 
Mr. Holbrook therefore respectfully requests this Court 
to vacate the order dismissing Plaintiff's Utah and Federal 
racketeering causes of action and to vacate the award to Firemaster 
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of action. (R. 3883, Paragraph 3). Mr. Holbrook further 
respectfully requests that the State and Federal racketeering 
claims be remanded to the Trial Court for further proceedings on 
the grounds that such claims have been pled sufficiently to defeat 
a motion to dismiss. 
C. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO PERMIT THE 
PLAINTIFF TO PUT ON EVIDENCE AT TRIAL OF LOST PROFITS INCURRED AS 
A RESULT OF THE WRONGFUL IMPOSITION OF THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
AND/OR ALTERNATIVELY TO PERMIT SUCH A DETERMINATION AS PART OF MR. 
HOLBROOK7S POST-TRIAL MOTION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF. 
Both of the decisions appealed from here were decisions 
of the Court which therefore are viewed under the "correctness" 
standard set forth in the Jones, supra case. 
The Court made its ruling to refuse Mr. Holbrook the 
right to put on evidence of lost profits based upon a motion in 
limine of Firemaster filed on the Friday before the Monday trial 
beginning. (R. 3034-45, 2887-3033). Mr. Holbrook's counsel, 
pointed out to the Court that at page 139 of his Second Amended 
Complaint (Tr. at R. 4481-85), he specifically requested damages 
for the wrongful imposition of the injunction. It is true that Mr. 
Holbrook did not say the two words that the Court and Firemaster 
believe to be "magic", those two words being lost profits. He did 
specifically request damages for the wrongful imposition of the 
injunction. 
It is true that Rule 9(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
requires that a claim for lost profits must be alleged with 
specificity. However, Firemaster is clearly on notice of the plain 
language of the complaint. The controlling case on this issue is 
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the Utah case of Cohen v. J.C. Penney Co., 537 P. 2d 306, (Utah 
1975) where the Court indicated that a failure to state the words 
"lost profits1' is not death to the ability of a Plaintiff to 
introduce such evidence, if the lost profits automatically flow 
from the injury complained of. 
In this case it is obvious that if Firemaster requested 
an injunction restraining Mr. Holbrook from performing services 
pursuant to that injunction and was required to post a $75,000 bond 
as they did, the fact that Mr. Holbrook would lose income from the 
failure to work would automatically follow. If the injunction was 
not wrongful, no damage exists to Mr. Holbrook. If the preliminary 
injunction was wrongful, Mr. Holbrook should be entitled to put on 
damages of the clearly consequential lost profits. 
The only purpose for Firemaster to post a $75,000.00 
injunction bond, was to guarantee such damages, if the injunction 
was wrongful. For Firemaster to thereafter argue it had no 
knowledge or notice that Mr. Holbrook would seek damages for lost 
profits as a result of such injunction is ludicrous. It is only 
too obvious that a party has notice of its own actions and 
consequently the ability to prepare regarding defending those 
actions. The Court clearly erred in refusing to permit evidence 
of the lost profits at trial or deciding the issue correctly 
thereafter. 
Mr. Holbrook brought the matter to the Trial Court's 
attention by way of his motion for declaratory relief after trial 
(R. 3194-95, 3196-3194, 3195-3350, 3351-53). The Court refused to 
grant damages to Mr. Holbrook as a result his request for 
declaratory relief for what apparently was the Court's finding that 
the injunction was not wrongfully entered. (Tr. at R. 4808-13, 
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4b^b, 4b44-4b). The ]ury verdicts finding that Firemaster breached 
all three of the contracts of the parties causes a tremendous 
conflict with the concept found by the Trial Court that the 
injunction was not wrongfully entered and is unexplained by the 
Trial Court either by findings of fact or law. 
The sole basis for the injunction in the first instance 
was Firemaster's alleged contractual right to have such an 
injunction, assuming that Firemaster had not breached the contracts 
and that Mr. Holbrook had further obligations under the contracts 
after January of 1990. The injunction was entered in March of 
1990. The clear independent findings of the jury and Trial Court 
were that Firemaster had breached all three of the agreements, that 
Mr. Holbrook had no further obligations under the contracts and 
there is no other explanation that follows except that the 
injunction was wrongfully entered. The Court does not have 
authority to reform the parties agreements. Cunningham, supra. 
In order to have any consistency and logic in the 
application of contractual rules and obligations, this Court must 
find that the breach of all three agreements and termination of 
Mr.Holbrook's obligations under those contracts mandates that the 
injunction was wrongfully entered and appropriate damages therefore 
must flow to the Plaintiff. 
Mr. Holbrook and all parties who have had their contracts 
breached by the other party, are entitled to a similar clear 
statement as set forth in the Kinsman and Wright, supra cases of 
this Court that a breaching party is by law not entitled to require 
performance of the nonbreaching party to the contracts. Without 
such a finding by this Court, all parties to contracts in the State 
of Utah will be totally at a loss as to how they should perform 
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once the other side to the contract has indicated their disdain for 
the written agreement by breaching such agreement. 
Mr. Holbrook submitted in his motion for directed verdict 
a request for $75,000.00 of damages for the wrongful imposition of 
the injunction. The Court had sufficient evidence before it to 
find that $75,000.00 would be an appropriate award of damages. (R. 
at 3146-94, 3195-3350). The Trial Court set that number as the 
bond amount based upon the representation by Firemaster that the 
$75,000 figure was approximately the amount of profit Mr. Holbrook 
had earned in his last full year with Firemaster while operating 
the independent contractor and franchise areas. (Tr. at R. 5139). 
The Trial Court should have awarded the entire $75,000.00 to Mr. 
Holbrook as a result of the wrongful imposition of the injunction 
and had substantial evidence to permit it to do so. 
This $75,000 figure was the amount the Court stated off 
the record it would order as a bond. Mr. Holbrook has asked for 
at least $500,000. Firemaster suggested the $75,000 figure based 
upon the amount it represented was Mr. Holbrook's net income for 
1989. 
Mr. Holbrook therefore respectfully requests this Court 
to find as error the Trial Court's refusal to permit him to put on 
evidence of damage at trial as a result of the wrongful imposition 
of the injunction, to ascribe as error the decision of the Trial 
Court regarding the Plaintiff's motion for declaratory relief not 
to permit him to put on further evidence of damage and/or to find 
that the Plaintiff was damaged in the amount of $75,000.00 for the 
wrongful imposition of the injunction. 
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u. xnc AVfAKU TU KK. HOliBROOK OF ONLY $5,872.36 IN 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR WHERE THE DISTRICT COURT 
REFUSED TO PERMIT EVIDENCE OF FIREMASTER'S NET WORTH TO GO TO THE 
JURY. 
Mr. Holbrook sought to admit the financial statement of 
Firemaster into evidence towards the close of his case. (Tr. at R. 
5442). Firemaster's counsel objected to the introduction of this 
evidence and the Court sustained this objection indicating that if 
it was going to be introduced, it would be after some later ruling 
by the Court. 
The special verdict relating to conversion by Firemaster 
requesting punitive damages was permitted by the parties and the 
Court to go to the jury and the jury returned an award of punitive 
damages without having reviewed any financial information con-
cerning Firemaster. (R. 2743-45). 
The cases of this Court are clear that it essential for 
the trier of fact to know the financial condition of a party 
against whom punitive damages are to be assessed for a correct 
determination of the amount of punitive damages. See Crookston v. 
Fire Insurance Exchange, 164 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1991). 
In post-trial motions, Firemaster interestingly raised 
this issue and it came for hearing before the Trial Court. In that 
hearing, (Tr. at R. 5795-5803), the Court indicated that it 
believed that the matter was not handled correctly. The Trial 
Court indicated that the Court, Plaintiff's Counsel and Defense 
Counsel all had a hand in causing the problem to not be handled 
correctly and that the matter should be resolved by way of a new 
trial on the correct amount of punitive damages. When the Court 
made such statements, counsel for Firemaster withdrew the motion. 
It is clear that the amount of punitive damages was not 
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correctly assessed pursuant to the criteria set forth under Utah 
law. See Crookston, supra. Since the issue was submitted 
incorrectly, the issue should be remanded for a new jury or a 
Court's determination of the correct amount of punitive damages. 
This is the procedure mandated under the Utah case of Bundy v. 
Century Equipment Co., 692 P.2d 754 (Utah 1984). 
E. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING MR. HOLBROOK'S 
MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT, JUDGMENT NOV, AND/OR MOTION FOR 
DECLARATORY RELIEF, STRIKING THE JURY VERDICT TO FIREMASTER FOR 
BREACH OF THE CONFIDENTIALITY PROVISIONS OF THE CONTRACT. 
The Trial Court erred in refusing to grant the 
Plaintiff's Motion for a Directed Verdict, for Judgment Notwith-
standing the Verdict and Declaratory Relief. Mr. Holbrook proved 
that Firemaster breached all the agreements during the applicable 
time periods of June 1987 through January 1990, and that all 
breaches alleged against Mr. Holbrook occurred after he terminated 
his relationship with Firemaster, and after enduring two and one-
half years of accounting abuses by Firemaster. Firemaster did not 
even put on any evidence that Mr. Holbrook had failed in any of his 
obligations under the contracts (Tr. at R. 5244-45) 
This is a mixed question of law and fact. The factual 
composition of the Directed Verdict Motion, Judgment NOV, and 
Declaratory Relief claims are reviewable under a clearly erroneous 
standard. See the case of Matter of Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d 
885 (Utah 1989). The legal propriety of the district Court's 
decision on this issue and the resulting legal effects are 
reviewable under correction of errors standard. Jones, supra. 
The cases decided by this Court of Wright and Kinsman, 
supra clearly establish that once a contract is breached by one 
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obligations under the contract. 
The only way to bring sanity and consistency to 
contractual relations, when breaches occur, is to conform to the 
rules set forth by this Court in the Wright and Kinsman, supra 
cases set forth above. 
Based upon Utah law and the facts as clearly found by the 
jury, and recognized independently by the Trial Court in this case, 
this Court as a matter of law must strike any awards to Firemaster 
flowing from obligations Mr. Holbrook would have had under the 
contracts but for Firemaster's breaches of the contracts between 
June of 1987 and January of 1990. This means that the Court must 
strike the jury verdict award of $10,000 to Firemaster, must 
sustain the Trial Court's decision not to impose liability on the 
notes, must find that Mr. Holbrook was therefore the "prevailing 
party" in the action for purposes of assessing attorneys' fees and 
costs, must find that Mr. Holbrook receive damages for the wrongful 
injunction, and must reverse the decision of the Trial Court 
charging Mr. Holbrook $11,014.00 in cash as an "equitable" payment 
in order for him to have access to the confidential customer list. 
F. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO AWARD MR. 
HOLBROOK HIS COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES AS THE PREVAILING PARTY IN 
THIS ACTION AND UNDER THE STANDARDS OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTION 
78-27-56. 
The standard for review in this matter is that for a 
mixed question of law and fact. The factual composition of the 
district Court's ruling is reviewable under a clearly erroneous 
standard. Matter of Estate of Bartell, supra. The legal issues 
of awarding attorney's fees and costs is reviewable under a 
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correction of error standard. Jones, supra. 
Once the Court makes the decision to terminate any 
further obligations of Mr. Holbrook after the breaches of 
Firemaster ending in January 1990, when Mr. Holbrook terminated 
with Firemaster, the refusal to grant Firemaster any further relief 
under the contracts dictates that Mr. Holbrook was the "prevailing 
party" of this action. Wright , supra. The contracts dictate this 
result. 
As set forth in each contract, Plaintiff's Exhibits 1, 
2 and 3, Firemaster wrote in it would be reimbursed all its costs 
and attorneys fees if it was forced to enforce any breaches of the 
agreements. Both Utah and California law make this obligation 
mutual. (R. 3195-3350). See Utah Code Annotated 78-27-56.5 cited 
above. See also West's Annotated California Civil Code Section 
1717, Attachment A hereto. 
Based on the contracts and the above referenced statutes, 
Mr. Holbrook is entitled to his costs and attorneys fees for having 
to enforce the contracts against Firemaster. Mr. Holbrook honored 
all his contracts for two and one-half years. Only after he could 
endure Firemaster's abuses no longer did he cease to honor the 
contracts. Such honor by Mr. Holbrook should be recognized and 
rewarded by this Court. Conversely, the lack of honor by 
Firemaster should be penalized by an award of costs and attorneys' 
fees to Mr. Holbrook. 
This decision is also true for purposes of assessing 
costs and attorney's fees under the Mountain States Broadcasting 
v. Neale, supra case which sets forth the "net" winner standard. 
Not only was Mr. Holbrook the "net" winner as described 
in the Mountain States, supra case but under the standard set forth 
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in Utah Code Annotated Section 7 8-27-5 6, the Trial Court abused its 
discretion in failing to award attorneys' fees to Mr. Holbrook 
where Firemaster was found to have tortiously converted his funds 
to have breached its fiduciary duty to Mr. Holbrook, to have 
breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing to Mr. 
Holbrook and punitive damages were awarded against Firemaster. 
Code Section States in pertincut as follows: 
(1) "In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable 
attorney's fees to a prevailing party if the court 
dtermines that the action or defense to the action was 
without merit andnot brought or asserted in good 
faith..." 
If a Plaintiff can convince a jury of all of the relief 
awarded to Mr. Holbrook in this action for the opposing party's 
tortious and bad faith conduct, including an award of punitive 
damages, he clearly has met the standard of Utah Code Annotated 78-
27-56 sufficient to permit the Court to award attorneys' fees and 
costs. If that statute has any meaning in the law of Utah, it was 
clear error not to apply it in this instance as requested by Mr. 
Holbrook and the failure to do so was a clear abuse of the Court's 
discretion. 
Additionally, the Court should consider the logistics 
problem facing Mr. Holbrook in bringing this action. He had to pay 
an attorney. He had to hire an accountant to dig through thousands 
of documents (Trial Exhibits 101-4182) that he had. already paid 
Firemaster $158,000 to track and account for. 
Firemaster is a large, multi-million dollar nationwide 
company. Mr. Holbrook is an individual Utah resident who earned 
a decent living but is not wealthy. For an individual such as Mr. 
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Holbrook to take on a nationwide company is an incredible effort. 
To prevail as Mr. Holbrook did and to show the bad faith and 
predatory action of Firemaster as it did clearly shows an 
entitlement to costs and attorneys' fees. 
Through no other process, except the award of costs, 
attorneys fees and punitive damages, can predatory companies such 
as Firemaster be stopped from doing to their contracting parties 
such as Mr. Holbrook what a jury unanimously found they did to Mr. 
Holbrook. 
Mr. Holbrook respectfully requests this Court to order 
that which Mr. Holbrook was entitled to his costs and attorneys' 
fees and to remand the issue of the amount to the Trial Court. 
G. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN REQUIRING MR. HOLBROOK 
TO PAY $11,014.00 IN CASH AS AN "EQUITABLE" PAYMENT TO FIREMASTER 
FOR ACCESS TO THE CONFIDENTIAL CUSTOMER LIST WHERE MR. HOLBROOK WAS 
FOUND TO HAVE FULLY PERFORMED HIS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE CONTRACTS 
This issue presents a mixed question of law and fact. 
As set forth above, the factual composition of the issue is 
reviewable under a clearly erroneous standard. See matter of 
Estate of Bartell, supra. The propriety of the application of 
equity sua sponte by the Trial Court to award Firemaster an 
"equitable" sum is reviewable under a correction of error standard. 
Jones, supra. 
The Trial Court saw and heard the evidence at trial, and 
made a decision declaring that Mr. Holbrook had no further 
obligations under his contracts except this "equitable payment" 
(Tr. at R. 4808-13, 4844-46). The Trial Court clearly was 
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entitled to any further relief under the contracts between the 
parties.(Tr. at R. 4844-46). Neither party requested equitable 
relief as imposed by the Court. The Court came up with the 
solution on its own. 
While the parties argued the Court's suggestion, Mr. 
Holbrook consistently maintained that Firemaster, because of its 
tortious conduct as found by the jury was not entitled to relief 
from a Court of equity. (R.3712-17). See Battistone v. American 
Land and Dev. Co., 607 P.2d 837 (Utah 1980); Bradford v. Alvey and 
Sons, 621 P.2d 1240 (Utah 1980). The case of Cunningham, supra at 
Page 553 indicates that the Trial Court should not revise the 
parties agreement by the use of equity. These parties before the 
Court have detailed contracts which should dictate their 
relationships as decided by the law of contracts. 
The Trial Court made no findings to identify any legal 
standard it relied upon to justify awarding equitable relief to 
Firemaster. (R. 3728-29). As such, it is difficult to specifically 
criticize the decision of the Trial Court. It is clear from the 
cases cited by Mr. Holbrook in his argument before the Trial Court 
that one coming into equity must do equity, must have clean hands 
or they would be barred from obtaining equitable relief. See 
Battistone, supra and Bradford, supra. Although Firemaster did not 
request the relief the Court awarded, it was the beneficiary of 
such relief. 
A party found to have breached contracts repeatedly, in 
hundreds of instances over a two and one-half year period, in a 
manner justifying the imposition of punitive damages precludes such 
party from requesting or receiving equitable relief from a Court, 
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or as in this case, from a Court Sua Sponte, without clear findings 
of fact or citation to law to support such a decision. 
The decision of the Trial Court to award Firemaster 
equitable relief was clearly erroneous and a clear abuse of its 
discretion. Therefore, such award to Firemaster should be vacated 
by this Court. 
IX. 
CONCLUSION 
This matter was tried to a jury for six days. Mr. 
Holbrook was required to pay an accountant to do over that which 
he had paid Firemaster over $158,000.00 to perform, i.e. 
bookkeeping and accounting services relating to the accounts 
serviced during the parties relationship. In that performance, 
Mr. Holbrook proved to the satisfaction of the jury that he had 
been damaged in the amount of $91,807. by the various breaches of 
contract and tortious activity of Firemaster. The amount awarded 
was less than one-half of the damage amounts testified to by Mr. 
Holbrook and his expert. 
All of the damage done by Firemaster to Mr. Holbrook 
occurred during the time period of June of 1987 and January of 
1990. 
The only claims Firemaster has against Mr. Holbrook are 
based upon actions of Mr. Holbrook from going into competition with 
Firemaster after January of 1990, after he had terminated his 
relationship with Firemaster because of Firemaster's prior 
repeated, egregious actions. 
Firemaster's appellate issues are all meritless because 
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and because of its waiver of the alleged errors by its own 
stipulations at trial. 
Firemaster failed to marshall any evidence to convince 
this Court of the correctness or soundness of its arguments, but 
instead chose solely to marshall certain evidence in its favor, a 
clear deviation from proper appellate procedure that should doom 
its appeals. 
A jury found unanimously for the Plaintiff on the wrongs 
set forth in the special verdicts. Independent of the jury, the 
Trial Court similarly found that Mr. Holbrook had no further 
obligations under the contracts with the exception of the 
$11,014.00 award, which was not an award under the contracts but 
a sua sponte award by the Trial Court. 
The 4,000 plus accounting exhibits which are the core of 
the wrongs in this case were completely reviewed only by Mr. 
Holbrook and Mr. Miller, his accountant. The problems pertaining 
to such exhibits as testified to at trial, and the intentional 
abuses of Mr. Holbrook's rights as testified to and recognized by 
the jury clearly provided substantial evidence for the jury's 
verdict. No one from Firemaster ever testified to show that the 
problems identified by Mr. Holbrook and Mr. Miller were incorrect. 
To go against the weight of what was testified about concerning 
those Exhibits is what a Court must do to set aside the jury's 
awards. The jury did not. Independent of the jury, Judge Brian 
did not. 
This Court has already decided thoughtful and appropriate 
precedent with its findings in the Wright, and Kinsman, supra 
cases. Mr. Holbrook was and should be lawfully excused from any 
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further performance under the contracts as a result of Firemaster's 
breaches. Mr. Holbrook should be totally excused from any and all 
performance including the striking of the Firemaster award of 
$10,000 for alleged breaches of the confidentiality provisions of 
the contracts, as a result of Firemaster's prior repeated breaches 
over two and one-half years. Mr. Holbrook honored his contracts. 
Firemaster did not. Such honor should be rewarded. 
The result of the threshold legal decision being made 
to strike the $10,000 award to Firemaster entitles Mr. Holbrook to 
his costs, attorneys' fees, a finding that the injunction in the 
case was wrongful, an award of damages to him from such wrongful 
injunction and a striking of the $11,014 "equitable" award. 
Additionally, the erroneous legal decisions of the Trial Court as 
argued in this brief relating to punitive damages, to dismissing 
Mr. Holbrook's Utah State and Federal Racketeering claims and the 
Court's refusal to permit Mr. Holbrook to put on evidence of his 
lost profits as a result of the injunction were prejudicial errors 
which should be resolved by a reversal of the decisions and a 
remand of those matters for further proceedings before the Trial 
Court. 
DATED this ay o£ ^U)+f^~\A^l^ , 1992. 
RICHARD N. BIGELOW 
Attorney for Plaintij 
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ATTACHMENT A 
the action. The eoun may allow me ruing 01 a pieaaing claiming naDuity naseo upon a a m 
conspiracy following the filing of a verified petition therefor accompanied by the propoeed pleading 
and tupporting affidavits ttating the facta upon which the liability it bated. The court thill order 
service of the petition upon the party against whom the action it propoeed to be filed and permit that 
party to tubmit opposing affidavit* prior to making its determination. Hie filing of the petition, 
propoeed pleading and accompanying affidavits shall toll the running of any applicable statute of 
limitations until the final determination of the matter, which ruling, if favorable to the petitioning 
party, thall permit the propoeed pleading to be filed. 
(Added by Stata.1988, c. 1052, } 1.) 
Historical aad Statatery Nairn "It it ihe intent of the UfUUture in enactinf thit nei-
1 M iffUUytoa sure to modify the decision of the Court of Appeal in 
Wolfrich Corp. v. United Service* Automobile Asm, 149 
Section 2 of StataWt, c 1052, provides: Cal.App Jd 1206 (1st Diat 1913)." 
| 1717. Action on contract; award of attorney's feet and costs; prefailing party; deposit of 
amounts In insured, interest-bearing account; damages not baaed on contract 
(a) In any action on a contract, where the contract specifically provides that attorney's fees and 
costs, which are incurred to enforce * * * that contract, shall be awarded either to one of the parties 
or to the prevailing party, then the party who it determined to be the party prevailing on the 
contract, whether he or ahe it the party specified in the contract or not, thall be entifleTto 
reasonable attorney's feet in addition to other coata * * • 
Where a contract provides for attorney's feet, at aet forth above, that provision thall be construed 
at applying to the entire contract, unless each party was representeTBy counsel in the negotiation 
and execution of the contract, and the fact of that representation it specified in the contract 
Reasonable attorney's fees thall be fixed by the court, • * * and thall be an element of the coats 
of tuit 
Attorney't feet provided for by thit section shall not be subject to waiver by the parties to any 
contract which it entered into after the effective date of thit section. Any provision in any tuch 
contract which providea for a waiver of attorney's feet it void. 
(bXl) The court, upon notice and motion by a party, thai! determine who k thc^arty prevailing on 
the contract for purposes of thit section, whether or not the tuit proceeds to final judgment Except 
an provided in paragraph (2), the party prevailing on the coo tract thai! be the party who recovered a 
greater relief in the action on the contract The court may alto determine that there is no party 
prevailing on the contract for purpoaea of thit section! 
(2) Where an action has been voluntarily dismissed or dismissed pursuant to a settlement of the 
esse, there thai! be no prevailing party for purpoaea of thit section. 
Where the defendant alleges in hit or her answer that be or the tendered to the plaintiff the full 
amount to which he or the was entitled, and thereupon deposits in court for the plaintiff, the amount 
to tendered, and the allegation it found to be true, then the defendant it deemed to be a party 
prevailing on the contract within the meaning of this section-
Where a depotit baa been made pursuant to thit section, the court shall, on the application of any 
party to the action, order the deposit to be invested in an insured, interest-bearing account Interest 
on the amount shall be allocated to the parties in the same proportion as the original funds are 
allocated. 
(c) In an action which seeks relief in addition to that based on a contract, if the party prevailing on 
the contract has damages awarded against it oiTcauses of action not on the contract, the amounts 
awarded to the party prevailing on the contract under this section shall be deducted from any 
3amagea awarded in favor of the party who did not Prevail on the contract If the amount awarded 
under'this section exceeds the amount of flamages awarded the party not prevailing on the contract 
the net amount shall be awarded the party prevailing on the contract and judgment may be entered 
5 favor of the party prevailing on the contract for that net amount 
(Amended by Stata.1986, c, ST?, | 1; Stata.1986, c 785, f 1; Stats. 1*87, c 1080, f 1.) 
Hletorkal aad Sutmtory NaSaa amount tendered b aa bitereat beahnf account upoc appb-
tm LegteUtSoa emtio* of any party. 
The 1986 ameadmeat hjr c 7S5 added the bat ptrynph 
whkh provided that the court should order depoait of the 
Additions or change* Indlcatad by undartnt; delations by aateriaka • • • 
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